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WE ARE ALL GROWING OLD TOGETHER: MAKING SENSE
OF AMERICA’S MONUMENT-PROTECTION LAWS
ZACHARY BRAY*
ABSTRACT
Monuments and the laws that protect them divide Americans
today as never before. American attitudes toward monuments have
always been a blend of affection, insecurity, and suspicion. But
Americans are now more invested in the built and natural monu-
ments that surround us: to be for, or against, protecting certain
monuments has now become a shorthand for one’s stance on a host
of cultural and political issues. These changing attitudes have
thrown American monument-protection laws into sharp relief. And
many local, state, and federal legislators and executive officials have
taken advantage of this opportunity to exploit America’s patchwork
of monument-protection laws, exacerbating already-fraught monu-
ment conflicts for short-term political gain.
Contemporary conflicts over American monuments are particular-
ly difficult to resolve for a number of reasons. Part of the problem is
a lack of agreement about what does or should count as a monument,
which is compounded by both the extreme diversity of American
monument-protection laws and a persistent rural-urban divide that
helps fuel many contemporary American monument conflicts. In ad-
dition, American monument-protection laws too often are considered
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in isolation, which undermines the possibility for achieving any kind
of consensus or settled outcome after individual monument conflicts.
These factors complicate public discourse about monuments,
monument-protection laws, and the conflicts that inevitably arise
from both. They also complicate every effort to study American
monuments and the laws that protect them. The absence of any
meaningful shared discourse, let alone consensus, makes American
monument conflicts particularly difficult to resolve, as the losing side
tends to find the application of American monument-protection laws
to be profoundly arbitrary. But in fact, many recent conflicts arising
from America’s diverse monument-protection laws follow similar
patterns—even though the political coalitions shift dramatically,
depending on what sort of monuments are at stake. This Article
reframes the debate over American monument-protection laws by
considering Confederate statue statutes, the National Historic Preser-
vation Act, and the Antiquities Act of 1906 together. It analyzes
recurring patterns of conflict that arise out of each statutory and
regulatory system and proposes repeal of the statue statutes and
reforms to the Antiquities Act.
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INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, monuments and the laws that protect them
have become one of the most persistent sources of conflict in
America. Shortly after the deadly violence triggered by Confederate
monuments in Charlottesville, Corey Stewart, a candidate in
Virginia’s 2018 senatorial elections, defended the monuments
against “the lunacy of taking them down.”1 According to Stewart,
monuments and monument-protection laws represent “the new
social issue of the twenty-first century,” providing him and others
with a political opportunity because monument protection creates
“the same amount of guttural reaction and concern that the pro-life
movement generated forty years ago.”2
The intensity of Stewart’s enthusiasm for using violent monu-
ment conflicts as an opportunity for political gain is unusual—even
unsettling—but many more thoughtful observers also have noted
the growing significance of monuments and monument-protection
laws in American public life. Like Stewart, Cornel West saw some-
thing new emerging from the turmoil over the Charlottesville
monuments and the laws that protect them from removal.3 For
West, who participated in demonstrations against the Charlottes-
ville monuments, the distinctive feature of the conflict was a “raw
hatred” expressed by the extremists who marched and fought to
celebrate the monuments, a hatred that he had never seen “coming
from so many people.”4 What Stewart and West both saw in
Charlottesville was a particularly acute example of a broader trend.
Across America, a wide range of natural landmarks, historic memo-
rials, and the laws that protect them have become focal points for
demonstrations, threats, and occasional violence from monument
opponents and supporters alike.5
1. Benjamin Wallace-Wells, The Fight Over Virginia’s Confederate Monuments, NEW
YORKER (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/12/04/the-fight-over-
virginias-confederate-monuments [https://perma.cc/VJP4-BXC8] (internal quotations omitted).
2. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
3. See id.
4. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
5. See, e.g., Jeremy B. White, Trump Greeted by Protesters Chanting “F*** You!” After
He Slashes Utah National Monuments, INDEPENDENT (Dec. 5, 2017, 12:32 AM), https://
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Although battles over American monuments have grown particu-
larly sharp in recent years, American attitudes toward monuments
have always been a blend of affection, insecurity, and suspicion. In
an 1843 address at Brown University, Rhode Island’s Chief Justice,
Job Durfee, gave voice to the American yearning for monuments in
a relatively young country, urging his audience, “O! let us build
monuments to the past.”6 Durfee thought that what America needed
was a host of new monuments to “tower on mound and mountain ...
and in our public squares” as tangible reminders of the country’s
“social mind.”7 And filling up the country with monuments was only
the beginning of the job. As Durfee reminded his audience, the
network of monuments he envisioned would need to be carefully
protected against alteration or “sacrilegious violence” that might
disrupt the transmission of “our idea of liberty and law” to future
generations.8 Other Americans in the mid- to late nineteenth cen-
tury echoed Durfee’s sentiments, expressing similar enthusiasm for
natural as well as built monuments. For example, Oliver Wendell
Holmes noted that the huge elm trees in public squares or village
greens were often the most significant monuments for many Amer-
ican communities.9 Indeed, his own first sense memories were
bound up with the monumental elms on Cambridge Common, which
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-protest-national-monuments-
shrink-parks-utah-announcement-latest-a8092076.html [https://perma.cc/PCW8-2S65]; see
also Joe Johnson et al., Protesters Clash at UNC-Chapel Hill, Less than a Week After Silent
Sam Was Toppled, HERALD-SUN (Aug. 25, 2018, 10:53 AM), https://www.heraldsun.com/
news/local/counties/orange-county/article217286120.html [https://perma.cc/4GP7-5XNX]
(noting multiple arrests for assault and violent clashes between protesters, days after a
Confederate monument was destroyed in earlier protests); Kevin Sullivan & Juliet Eilperin,
In the Nevada Desert, Bundy Family Warns of Another Standoff, WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/2016/11/01/c45bdf4e-a04c-11e6-a44d-cc2898c
fab06_story.html [https://perma.cc/CW6B-HSEJ] (quoting a number of sources threatening
armed resistance to President Obama’s planned monument in Gold Butte, Nevada).
6. Job Durfee, The Influence of Scientific Discovery and Invention on Social and Political
Progress (Sept. 6, 1843), in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF THE HON. JOB DURFEE, LL. D. 315, 344-
45 (1849) (quoting from an oration delivered to the Phi Beta Kappa Society of Brown
University).
7. Id. at 345.
8. Id.
9. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Introduction to LORIN L. DAME, TYPICAL ELMS AND OTHER
TREES OF MASSACHUSETTS 7, 8 (1890).
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had “entered into [his] young life as truly as the milk that made its
blood.”10
But for some Americans, especially early in the country’s history,
these monumental impulses were an un-American distraction from
the commitment to industry and innovation responsible for the
country’s character and good fortune.11 In an 1825 memoir commis-
sioned to celebrate the completion of the Erie Canal, congressman
and former mayor of New York Cadwallader D. Colden wrote that
communal infrastructure improvements like canals would be the
“proudest monuments” in America, rather than natural objects or
ruins of the past.12 Colden believed that America was uniquely
capable of producing great works like the Erie Canal because it was
free from “scenes indicating present decay, and foreboding constant
deterioration.”13 Instead of focusing on the built or natural land-
scape as something to be preserved, Colden and many others
thought that “every object” in American life should remain “new,
youthful, and vigorous,” directing the country forward to “the
promised sunshine of the future.”14
While American attitudes toward monuments have long been
mixed, in the past few decades enthusiasm for monuments has had
the upper hand.15 Thanks to recurring waves of both monument
designation and monument-protection laws, we have fulfilled
Justice Durfee’s vision: now we have monuments, and lots of them.16
Our landscapes and lives are freighted with the weight of these
10. See id. (recalling the impression of waving elm trees on his infant “retina[s]”).
11. DAVID LOWENTHAL, THE PAST IS A FOREIGN COUNTRY 110 (1985); see also MICHAEL
KAMMEN, MYSTIC CHORDS OF MEMORY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF TRADITION IN AMERICAN
CULTURE 42 (1991) (noting that unlike many other societies, “for much of American history
the inhabitants of this continent clearly indicated that they did not want power to reside in
pastness”).
12. Cadwallader D. Colden, Memoir Prepared at the Request of a Committee of the
Common Council of the City of New York and Presented to the Mayor of the City, at the
Celebration of the Completion of the New York Canals, in 2 THE HISTORY AND TOPOGRAPHY OF
THE UNITED STATES OF NORTH AMERICA 350, 374, 376 (John Howard Hinton ed., 3d ed. 1852).
13. Id. at 376.
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Dell Upton, Why Do Contemporary Monuments Talk So Much?, in COM-
MEMORATION IN AMERICA 11, 11-13, 19, 21 (David Gobel & Daves Rossell eds., 2013).
16. Part I.B of this Article will delve into the growth of monuments and the laws that
protect them.
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monuments, the laws that protect them, and the conflicts that
inevitably arise from both.17
A few short examples show how contemporary fights over mon-
uments in America are often intertwined with laws originally
designed to protect monuments from modification or removal. In
New York, shortly before his reelection in the fall of 2018, Governor
Andrew Cuomo moved to protect the monument in Columbus
Circle—a monument which has been the subject of several protests
and studied for potential removal by a city commission.18 Across
several southwestern states, prayer runners from a number of
Native American tribes united to protest President Trump’s 2017
reduction of the Bears Ears National Monument,19 while large cor-
porations called the monument reduction an “illegal” theft of pro-
tected land.20 In 2016, an Oregon sheriff threatened armed conflict
with federal authorities if President Obama designated the Owyhee
Canyonlands as a national monument.21 And in some southern
states, monuments to the Confederacy and protective “statue stat-
utes” have provided flashpoints for violent demonstrations by rac-
ist extremists,22 harking back to the eras in which many of these
monuments were originally constructed.23
17. See SANFORD LEVINSON, WRITTEN IN STONE: PUBLIC MONUMENTS IN CHANGING
SOCIETIES 26 (1st ed. 1998) (noting that “it is almost literally impossible to pick up any issue
of a newspaper or magazine without finding examples” of conflicts over American monu-
ments).
18. Katie Honan, Cuomo Moves to Protect the City’s Columbus Statue as He Marches in
Parade, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 8, 2018, 5:47 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cuomo-moves-to-
protect-citys-columbus-statue-as-he-marches-in-parade-1539035256 [https://perma.cc/R2G2-
YJ9P].
19. Native Tribes Unite in Prayer Run to Support Bears Ears National Monument,
NAVAJO-HOPI OBSERVER (Jan. 2, 2018, 9:40 AM), https://www.nhonews.com/news/2018/jan/02/
native-tribes-unite-prayer-run-support-bears-ears-/ [https://perma.cc/UT7J-XQZ7].
20. Christine Hauser, Patagonia, REI and Other Outdoor Retailers Protest Trump’s
Decision to Shrink Utah Monuments, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/12/05/business/patagonia-trump-utah.html [https://perma.cc/87XB-F8RV].
21. Andrew Selsky, Sheriff Warns Monument Could Spark Standoff, MAIL TRIB. (May 23,
2016), https://mailtribune.com/news/state-news/sheriff-warns-monument-could-spark-standoff
[https://perma.cc/3L9X-A7SL].
22. See, e.g., Richard C. Schragger, When White Supremacists Invade a City, 104 VA. L.
REV. ONLINE 58, 59-64 (2018) (discussing the “statue statute” at the center of the white
supremacist rally in Charlottesville, Virginia).
23. Zachary Bray, Monuments of Folly: How Local Governments Can Challenge
Confederate “Statue Statutes,” 91 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 12-15 (2018).
1266 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1259
Of course, not every American monument is a source of con-
troversy. Many are sources of community pride or distinction,24
touchstones of collective memory,25 or merely part of the visual
and mental backdrop of their neighbors’ daily lives.26 Moreover, it
would be wrong to suggest that fights over monuments are an en-
tirely new feature of American life: as Part I will show, the history
of American monument conflicts is older than the history of the
United States. But the frequency, intensity, and visibility of con-
flicts over monuments in America today is something new in our
history, as participants in these conflicts have observed. To be for,
or against, protecting certain types of monuments has now become
a shorthand for one’s stance on a host of cultural and political
issues.
Part of the problem with contemporary American monument
conflicts is not particularly legal, but is simply the result of the na-
ture of many American monuments. As Part I will show, Americans
have lots of monuments that were built or acquired relatively
recently, as two great waves of enthusiasm for monuments washed
over the country in the last century plus. Many of these monuments
were built or acquired without much deliberation, and some are
protected even though they now appear to be mistakes.27 For ex-
ample, take Abraham Lincoln’s birthplace in Kentucky, a national
historical park whose significance has been repeatedly recognized
by protective legislation.28 Visitors to Lincoln’s Birthplace must
24. See, e.g., Lorraine Boissoneault, Why an Alabama Town Has a Monument Honoring
the Most Destructive Pest in American History, SMITHSONIAN (May 31, 2017), https://www.
smithsonianmag.com/history/agricultural-pest-honored-herald-prosperity-enterprise-alabama-
180963506/ [https://perma.cc/8S3P-SUEC] (discussing the monument in Coffee County,
Alabama, erected “[i]n profound appreciation of the boll weevil and what it has done as the
herald of prosperity” (internal quotations omitted)).
25. See, e.g., Upton, supra note 15, at 26-31 (discussing the process of memorialization in
the contemporary monumental process through a variety of monuments created to com-
memorate September 11, 2001).
26. See, e.g., Suzannah Smith Miles, Castle Pinckney: Silent Sentinel in Charleston
Harbor, MOULTRIE NEWS (Nov. 27, 2012), https://www.moultrienews.com/archives/castle-
pinckney-silent-sentinel-in-charleston-harbor/article_aef80ee9-21a1-5486-bdb1-434c8f701f45.
html [https://perma.cc/M2HU-N85G] (describing Castle Pinckney, once a national monument,
as “an abandoned, silent sentinel in Charleston’s harbor”).
27. See, e.g., Michael Kammen, The American Past Politicized: Uses and Misuses of His-
tory, 617 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 42, 46 (2008).
28. Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-11, § 7114, 123
Stat. 991, 1202 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 217b (2012)) (redesignating Lincoln’s
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climb fifty-six stairs and then enter a building designed like an
ancient Greek temple or a nineteenth-century American bank that
houses a log cabin.29 The cornerstone of the stone shrine was laid by
President Theodore Roosevelt in 1909.30 At the dedication, Roosevelt
told the audience that “th[is] rude log cabin ... has come to mean to
... Americans what the humble stable in Bethlehem means to ...
Christians[, and] so the American people have ennobled the
birthplace of Lincoln by housing it within a marble Temple of
Fame.”31 But the cabin within this shrine is a replica with no
connection to the former President other than that dreamed up by
nineteenth-century showmen who passed the cabin off as authentic,
more or less, despite widespread skepticism even before the stone
shrine was created.32 In other words, the heart of the monument to
Honest Abe’s birthplace is a fake, but that has proved no bar to the
monument’s creation or continued preservation, like so many other
legally protected American monuments that remain in place long
after the original justification for their preservation has deterio-
rated.33
Lincoln’s Birthplace shows that any monument is essentially a
window into past perspectives on the significance and value of cer-
tain people, places, or events—especially the perspectives of those
in the community who were empowered to make such decisions at
the times the monuments were created, altered, or protected from
change.34 And thus every decision about preserving an object, built
Birthplace as a national historical park); Act of Sept. 8, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-231, 73 Stat. 466
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 217 (2012)) (redesignating the park as a national
historical site); Act of July 17, 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-160, 39 Stat. 385 (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 211-214 (2012)) (designating the site as a national park).
29. The First Lincoln Memorial, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/abli/bicentennial-
commencement-event.htm [https://perma.cc/CVZ3-N58D].
30. Id.
31. Zach Klitzman, Remembering Lincoln’s Birthplace, PRESIDENT LINCOLN’S COTTAGE
(Feb. 12, 2011), https://www.lincolncottage.org/remembering-lincolns-birthplace/ [https://
perma.cc/W8FU-EMQG].
32. See, e.g., Did Abraham Lincoln Sleep Here?, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2018, 10:21 AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/did-abraham-lincoln-sleep-here/ [https://perma.cc/9GPK-
D77X] (describing both recent efforts to date the cabin and the 1890s hucksters who passed
off the replica as having some connection to Lincoln).
33. See Kammen, supra note 27, at 46.
34. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Hallowed Ground: The Gettysburg Battlefield in Historic
Preservation Law, 22 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 203, 268 (2009) (noting that “[d]ecisions about [the]
preservation and presentation of a historic site” bear witness to the perspectives of “those
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or natural, involves some measure of judgment about the object’s
significance which may, and likely will, become outdated, at least in
part.35 Moreover, decisions about protecting monuments, like many
other decisions about preserving physical objects or places, neces-
sarily involve open-ended and elastic values.36 This invocation of
open-ended and elastic values, in turn, makes decisions about
monument creation and preservation extraordinarily hard to jus-
tify to those who disagree with them.37 To the losers of monument
fights, the winners seem to be exercising authority that is almost
entirely arbitrary, in order to change or preserve a set of values
that may well become outdated in what is inherently at least a
lasting if not entirely permanent way.38 And sometimes the losers
are right. Even the term “preservation” is an ambiguous term and
concept whose meaning in almost any specific situation is subject to
contestation: depending on the context, it can mean simple main-
tenance, or restoration, or even some forms of adaptation in the face
of changed conditions.39
Difficulties associated with the arbitrary nature of monument
creation and preservation, and the occasionally bizarre nature of
American monuments, are compounded by many American
monument-protection laws. For example, most of the statue statutes
that protect Confederate monuments are ostensibly designed to
protect monuments depicting a wide range of historic events or
past American conflicts.40 Moreover, many of the statutes’ defend-
ers argue that statutes are intended to protect the general “his-
tory” or “heritage” of their states, not Confederate monuments in
with power” when the decisions were made); see also Stephen Clowney, Landscape Fairness:
Removing Discrimination from the Built Environment, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1, 3 (arguing that
the landscape “inscribes selective and misleading versions of the past in solid, material
forms”).
35. Carol M. Rose, Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law of Historic
Preservation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 473, 476 (1981).
36. Id. at 476-77.
37. See id. at 476-79.
38. See id.
39. Id. at 476-77.
40. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1812 (2019) (protecting all “monuments or memorials”
that appear on the statute’s list of fifteen wars, conflicts, or “any engagement of ” same,
ranging from the “Algonquin” conflict to “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” and including “Confed-
erate or Union monuments or memorials of the War Between the States”).
2020] WE ARE ALL GROWING OLD TOGETHER 1269
particular.41 But this is not true, and opponents of the statue
statutes know that it is not true.42 The statue statutes were not
designed to protect the general history or heritage of their states,
but rather to protect Confederate monuments from alteration or
removal; moreover, that is how they have been applied since they
were enacted, almost without exception.43 This disconnect makes the
statue statutes seem particularly arbitrary to those who wish to
alter or remove Confederate monuments but are frustrated by these
statutes.
To take another example, national monuments are governed by
the Antiquities Act of 1906, which states that these monuments
should “be confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper
care and management of the objects to be protected.”44 Many stu-
dents of the legislative history of the Act agree that it was originally
intended to protect relatively small chunks of land surrounding
discrete and vulnerable archaeological sites or natural wonders,
especially in the American southwest.45 But almost immediately af-
ter the Act was passed, President Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed
monuments that were tens and even hundreds of thousands of acres
large.46 His successors followed suit, and in recent years some pres-
idents have proclaimed monuments that dwarf even Roosevelt’s
dreams.47
41. See Joe Sterling, A New Alabama Law Makes Sure Confederate Monuments Are Here
to Stay, CNN (May 26, 2017, 5:19 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/26/us/alabama-con
federate-monuments-bill-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/RKR6-95CK] (referring to com-
ments made by Alabama State Senator Gerald Allen, one of the sponsors of Alabama’s statue
statute).
42. See, e.g., id. (quoting State Senator Hank Sanders, an opponent of Alabama’s statue
statute, who like the Southern Poverty Law Center, argued that the law “is clearly about
Confederate memorials”).
43. See infra Part II.A; see also Bray, supra note 23, at 19-44 (reviewing the legislative
history and enforcement history of statue statutes).
44. 54 U.S.C. § 320301(b) (2012).
45. See, e.g., Mark Squillace, The Monumental Legacy of the Antiquities Act of 1906, 37
GA. L. REV. 473, 477 (2003).
46. See infra notes 326-29 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 9558, 82 Fed. Reg. 1139 (Jan. 5, 2017) (President Obama’s
proclamation establishing Bears Ears National Monument, approximately 1.35 million acres
in size); Proclamation No. 8335, 74 Fed. Reg. 1557 (Jan. 12, 2009) (President George W.
Bush’s proclamation establishing the Marianas Trench Marine National Monument, over
approximately 95,216 square miles of submerged lands and waters).
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There may be good reasons for this expansive interpretation of
the Antiquities Act—and these good reasons will be explored at
length later in this Article.48 But the apparent disconnect between
the statute’s narrow text and its expansive application makes
national monuments hard to justify to their opponents—especially
opponents who live near the monuments.49 Here, too, the perceived
disconnect between the stated purpose of the monument-protection
law and its application exacerbates the pain associated with con-
temporary American monument conflicts, at least for those on the
losing side.
In addition, many contemporary American monument conflicts
are particularly fraught because of their connection with the grow-
ing divide between rural and urban areas in America. This rural-
urban divide is both cultural and structural: it reflects substantial
differences between how Americans in different areas feel about
each other and a variety of issues,50 but it is also created by dif-
ferences in power between state and local governments inherent in
the American federal system.51 This divide grows from both long-
standing historical roots as well as relatively recent economic de-
velopments,52 and it impacts a host of different issues, often in
dynamic and counterintuitive ways.53
In the case of contemporary conflicts over monuments and the
laws that protect them, the rural-urban divide tends to drive the
48. See infra Part III.
49. Cf. Rob Bishop, President Trump’s Courageous Decision to Shrink Utah Monuments
Places Principle Ahead of Politics, NAT’L REV. (Dec. 7, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.national
review.com/2017/12/utah-national-monuments-donald-trump-downsizing/ [https://perma.cc/
L2M5-BCJQ].
50. See, e.g., Jose A. DelReal & Scott Clement, Rural Divide, WASH. POST (June 17, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/national/rural-america/ [https://perma.cc/
PEP8-R5QM] (exploring survey results that track the growing divide across a range of
personal and cultural values between people who live in rural areas and people who live in
or near cities).
51. See Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163, 1167
(2018) (concluding that “structural anti-urbanism” in America “reflects and reinforces the
widening political gap between American cities and other parts of the country”).
52. See, e.g., Eliza Griswold, The Historical Roots of the US Rural-Urban Divide Run Deep,
GUARDIAN (July 4, 2018, 12:59 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/commentisfree/
2018/jul/04/us-rural-urban-divide-historical-roots [https://perma.cc/DFG8-QFUL].
53. See, e.g., Richard Florida, Wages Are Higher in Urban Areas, but Growing Faster in
Rural Ones, CITYLAB (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/life/2018/10/wages-are-higher-
urban-areas-growing-faster-rural-ones/571534/ [https://perma.cc/BT26-63BE].
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residents of urban communities against the residents of rural and
exurban communities, state governments against local govern-
ments, and federal authorities against both state and local govern-
ments. The rural-urban divide is consistent across these different
types of monument conflicts, even though rural and urban interests
often find themselves on opposite sides of the divide, depending on
what types of monuments are at stake.
In other words, conflicts over American monuments tend to in-
volve relatively stable coalitions, but the rhetoric deployed by these
coalitions shifts dramatically depending on where the monument is
located. To take just one example, this is why President Trump de-
plores the potential loss of Confederate monuments in civic spaces
but celebrates the potential removal of national monuments in rural
places.54
More is at stake here than the appearance of political oppor-
tunism. America’s patchwork of monument-protection laws work
a toxic alchemy with the current rural-urban divide and our com-
plicated historical attitudes toward monuments, which together give
many contemporary American monument conflicts their particularly
poisonous nature.55 For example, conflicts over national monuments
created pursuant to the Antiquities Act frequently involve protec-
tions over natural or historic resources that are located in rural
areas.56 The protections created for a national monument under the
Antiquities Act may be popular with the general public, especially
in urban areas that are some distance away from the protected
land.57 But these monuments are often profoundly unpopular, at
least in the short term, with nearby rural populations who often
54. See, e.g., Eugene Scott, Trump Argued for Keeping Confederate Monuments. Then He
Scaled Back Those of Native Americans, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/12/06/trump-argued-for-keeping-confederate-monuments-then-
he-scaled-back-those-of-native-americans/ [https://perma.cc/2SJV-FJUG].
55. See, e.g., Carrie Kaufman, Gold Butte, the Bundy Family, and Desecration of Sacred
Artifacts, KNPR (May 2, 2016), https://knpr.org/knpr/2016-05/gold-butte-bundy-family-and-
desecration-sacred-artifacts [https://perma.cc/82JZ-BW67] (describing the desecration of
monumental petroglyphs and burial sites on what became Gold Butte National Monument).
56. See, e.g., Kathryn Schulz, Why Two Chefs in Small-Town Utah Are Battling President
Trump, NEW YORKER (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/10/01/why-
two-chefs-in-small-town-utah-decided-to-sue-president-trump [https://perma.cc/CW2W-8YSV]
(describing the “spectacular, desolate, and extreme” landscape in remote southern Utah
around the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument).
57. See, e.g., White, supra note 5.
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view monument protections as a check on economic activity and a
threat to their previous way of life,58 and who argue that the crea-
tion and preservation of national monuments is an exercise in fed-
eral tyranny over state and local rights, unsupported by the text or
legislative history of the governing statute.59
A similar set of arguments is deployed in conflicts over monu-
ments protected by statue statutes, although the coalitions involved
essentially switch sides. In fights over statue statutes, local control
is often less important to state governments influenced or controlled
by residents of rural and exurban areas than in fights over national
monuments. In this context, state governments argue that the
statue statutes should preempt local efforts to alter or remove the
monuments in question.60 On the other hand, local governments and
activists in relatively diverse large urban areas or university towns
argue that statue statutes represent an abridgement of constitution-
ally protected individual rights and an unmerited intrusion by the
state into matters that should be under local control.61 For those
who wish to alter or remove Confederate monuments in their own
neighborhood, the absence of any concern for local control over these
monuments by state legislators and officials may seem hypocritical
at best.62
In summary, America’s monument-protection laws have com-
bined with Americans’ complicated historical attitudes toward
monuments and the present rural-urban divide to intensify the
58. See, e.g., Louise Liston, Sustaining Traditional Community Values, 21 J. LAND,
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 585, 585 (2001) (describing how President Clinton’s proclamation of
the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument transformed “[a] once proud and peace-
loving people ... into a hostile, antagonistic, suspicious, and distrustful community”).
59. See James R. Rasband, Utah’s Grand Staircase: The Right Path to Wilderness
Preservation?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 483, 483-86 (1999).
60. See, e.g., Complaint at 2, State v. City of Birmingham, No. 01-CV-2017-903426.00 (Ala.
Cir. Ct. Aug. 16, 2017).
61. See, e.g., Ariel Worthy, Birmingham Confederate Monument: City Leaders Weigh Steps
to Remove Landmark, BIRMINGHAM TIMES (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.birminghamtimes.
com/2017/08/city-leaders-weigh-steps-to-remove-confederate-monuments/ [https://perma.cc/
CFN3-455K] (noting statements made by Birmingham’s mayor and city council president).
62. See, e.g., Lisa Provence, Confederates Win: Subcommittee Kills Bill to Give Localities
Control of Statues, C-VILLE WKLY. (Jan. 30, 2019, 5:26 PM), https://www.c-ville.com/confed
erates-win-subcommittee-kills-bill-to-give-localities-control-of-statues/ [https://perma.cc/FA
U6-REV5] (quoting University of Virginia professor Frank Dukes, who argued that state leg-
islators’ defenses of Virginia’s statue statutes were “so hypocritical from people who con-
stantly talk about local control”).
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inherently arbitrary nature of monument conflicts, fueling a near-
constant storm cycle of controversy and violence. Unfortunately,
American monument-protection laws are rarely considered together,
in part because the problems arising under discrete types of mon-
ument-protection laws have proven to be so significant in recent
years. For example, scholars who have considered Confederate
statue statutes have focused on the vulnerability that these statutes
impose on local governments, or the flaws inherent in the statutes
that may provide opportunities for some local governments to act
against protected Confederate monuments.63 Similarly, much recent
scholarship about the Antiquities Act has focused on relatively
narrow but pressing issues, particularly whether the President has
the authority to abolish or reduce an existing national monument.64
In addition, American monument-protection laws are rarely con-
sidered together because natural and built monuments themselves
are rarely considered together in legal scholarship. This is symptom-
atic of a larger issue: a deep-seated schism between the way we talk
about and regulate “wild” natural and “tamed” cultural resources as
if they are and ought to be fundamentally different categories.65
This is a mistake that must be removed in order to improve the way
Americans protect and fight about monuments and the laws that
protect them.
This Article seeks to reframe the debates over some of the most
important monument-protection laws in America by considering
them together, analyzing their common problems, and providing
suggestions for reform where possible. Part I explores the evolution
of both built and natural monuments in America, showing that both
types of monuments, as well as laws that protect them, evolved on
parallel tracks and at roughly similar times. Part I also directly ad-
dresses the category mistake that too often divides our discourse
63. See, e.g., Bray, supra note 23, at 20-44, 50-52; Schragger, supra note 22, at 61-67.
64. Compare Jedediah Britton-Purdy, Whose Lands? Which Public? The Shape of Public-
Lands Law and Trump’s National Monument Proclamations, 45 ECOLOGY L.Q. 921, 924-25
(2019), and Mark Squillace et al., Presidents Lack the Authority to Abolish or Diminish
National Monuments, 103 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 55, 56 (2017), with John Yoo & Todd Gaziano,
Presidential Authority to Revoke or Reduce National Monument Designations, 35 YALE J. REG.
617, 619-20 (2018).
65. See Christine A. Klein, Preserving Monumental Landscapes Under the Antiquities Act,
87 CORNELL L. REV. 1333, 1336 (2002).
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over natural and built monuments and the hodgepodge of laws that
protect them. Part II provides a comparative examination of the
statue statutes and the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA),
providing additional reasons to get rid of the statue statutes beyond
those advanced in previous work,66 while highlighting problematic
aspects of the NHPA that can echo aspects of the statue statutes.
Part III examines the Antiquities Act and national monuments,
compares the Antiquities Act to the NHPA and the statue statutes,
and suggests reforms of the Antiquities Act and the designation of
future national monuments.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN MONUMENTS AND THE BIRTH OF
AMERICAN MONUMENT-PROTECTION LAWS
There are lots of monuments in contemporary America, and lots
of laws that protect such monuments, but the ordinary usage of
“monument” is somewhat imprecise,67 so much so that many of the
laws that protect American monuments leave “monument” unde-
fined.68 Some of the fuzziness around the term is the irreducible
consequence of changing ideas about what can and should count as
a monument. For example, as a walk around the National Mall will
66. See Bray, supra note 23, at 12-19. In this previous work cited here, I surveyed the
constitutional arguments made by others against the statue statutes; later on in this previous
work, I provided a detailed review of the statue statutes along with a set of suggestions about
how local governments might comply with the statue statutes while removing or altering
Confederate monuments. See id. at 20-44; see also infra notes 174-76 (reviewing these
arguments in more detail here). In this work, I compare the NHPA to the statue statutes, in
part to provide an entirely different set of arguments to get rid of the statue statutes beyond
those advanced in previous work.
67. Leaving out archaic and obsolete entries, Merriam-Webster defines “monument” as:
“a written legal document or record;” “a lasting evidence, reminder, or example of someone
or something notable or great;” “a distinguished person;” “a memorial stone or a building
erected in remembrance of a person or event;” “a boundary or position marker;” “a national
monument;” and finally as “a written tribute.” Monument, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/monument [https://perma.cc/V456-DM3M]. Merriam-Webster
separately defines “national monument” in part as a “place of historic, scenic, or scientific
interest set aside for preservation.” National Monument, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/national%20monument [https:// perma.cc/MB7Z-2F93].
68. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 50-3-1(b)-(c) (2019) (protecting certain “monument[s]” as
well as memorials, plaques, and markers without defining the terms); see also RONALD F. LEE,
NAT’L PARK SERV., THE ANTIQUITIES ACT OF 1906, at 75 (1970) (reviewing the legislative
history of the Antiquities Act and finding no real definition for the term “monument” therein).
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reveal, American public spaces contain many old statues of dead
men on horses or pedestals, even though Americans now recognize
many different forms of built memorials as similarly monumental.69
As used in this Article, the term “monument” refers to any specific
physical landmark, object, or place, which may be built or natural,
and which is set aside from ordinary use for special attention,
regard, or study. A monument may be public or privately owned, but
it tends toward at least some limited display or shared use.70 All
monuments, whether natural or built, are an attempt to fix a
certain set of values and messages in a physical place.71
Monuments need not be protected by law, but many monuments
in the United States are so protected, sometimes by laws that allow
little local input about whether the monuments can be altered or
removed. For the purposes of this Article’s definition, any relevant
legal terminology is suggestive but not determinative: in other
words, a million-acre marine national monument may have fewer
conventionally “monumental” characteristics than a stone shrine at
a former President’s birthplace, even if the latter is called a park or
preserve. As a result, this Article’s definition of a “monument” is
somewhat ambiguous at the margins, like most people’s working
understanding of the term.
Whether monuments are shaped by human hands or natural
forces, once recognized they become “a kind of natural fact, as if
[they] had always been meant to be.”72 The process of creating or
recognizing a monument sets a part of the world apart from at least
some types of everyday change and ordinary human interactions.
Put another way, once their special place in a landscape is recog-
nized, monuments, whether built or natural, become “imbued” with
an aura of “permanence,” and the public develops an “instinctual
aversion” to their alteration or removal.73
69. See, e.g., KIRK SAVAGE, MONUMENT WARS: WASHINGTON, D.C., THE NATIONAL MALL,
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE MEMORIAL LANDSCAPE 2 (2009).
70. Cf. Upton, supra note 15, at 13 (noting that even private monuments “stand toward
the public end of a public-private axis”).
71. See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra note 17, at 6-8.
72. KIRK SAVAGE, STANDING SOLDIERS, KNEELING SLAVES: RACE, WAR, AND MONUMENT IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 7 (2018).
73. Cheryl Jiménez Frei, Towards Memory, Against Oblivion: A Comparative Perspective
on Public Memory, Monuments, and Confronting a Painful Past in the United States and
Argentina, PUB. HISTORIAN (Sept. 2017), http://tph.ucpress.edu/content/special-virtual-issue-
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This aura of permanence surrounds both built and natural
monuments; indeed, it is striking how often built and natural mon-
uments are compared, especially when their permanence is at stake.
For natural monuments, once their monumental characteristics are
recognized, these most natural of “natural facts” frequently are
described in terms that echo built monuments or significant build-
ings, especially when the importance of their preservation is at
issue.74 Similarly, a built monument carries layers of weight beyond
its physical presence. It becomes a “landmark of power” in its built
setting,75 taking on something like the aura of permanence that
surrounds a great tree or geological formation. This is no accident:
built monuments are sited and designed to discourage even imag-
ination about their alteration, evoking the permanence of natural
landmarks even when their original messages fall silent.76
Beyond these implicit messages of stability and resistance to
change, all monuments are meant to evoke and reinforce various
specific values or stories presently important to at least some mem-
bers of a community. After all, part of their purpose is to reinforce
and transmit these stories and values into the future.77 But in
addition to the specific messaging associated with any individual
monument, the simple work of creating, recognizing, and protecting
monuments—whether built or natural—also involves processes of
communal mental manipulation that help these built objects or
natural places resist change. These multiple layers of manipulation
create the potential for conflict everywhere that monuments and
laws that protect them are found, even when the original messages
associated with the monuments may have dimmed over time.
monuments-memory-politics-and-our-publics [https://perma.cc/K5U4-9B8Q].
74. See, e.g., JOHN MUIR, MY FIRST SUMMER IN THE SIERRA 196 (1911) (comparing the
beauty of nature to that of a cathedral); see also James R. Rasband, Antiquities Act
Monuments: The Elgin Marbles of Our Public Lands?, in THE ANTIQUITIES ACT: A CENTURY
OF AMERICAN ARCHAEOLOGY, HISTORIC PRESERVATION, AND NATURE CONSERVATION 137, 137
(David Harmon et al. eds., 2006).
75. See Catherine W. Bishir, Landmarks of Power: Building a Southern Past in Raleigh
and Wilmington, North Carolina, 1885-1915, in WHERE THESE MEMORIES GROW: HISTORY,
MEMORY, AND SOUTHERN IDENTITY 139, 139 (W. Fitzhugh Brundage ed., 2000).
76. Robert Justin Lipkin, Down with Flags, Statues, and Monuments: Cultural Memory
in a Deliberative Democracy, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 239, 258 (2000).
77. See, e.g., DAVID RIEFF, IN PRAISE OF FORGETTING: HISTORICAL MEMORY AND ITS IRONIES
11 (2016); see also LEVINSON, supra note 17, at 1-11 (gathering examples).
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For example, a Spanish statute passed in 2007 provided for the
removal of many monuments connected with the Spanish Civil War
and the Francoist regime,78 but disputes remain over monuments
that have been removed as well as those that have been left in place
for their alleged architectural merit or some other reason.79 In South
Africa, a statute passed in 1999 provides for the protection and the
potential modification of natural, historical, and archaeological
monuments and other “heritage resources.”80 Due to its flexibility
and comprehensive scope, the South African National Heritage
Resources Act is frequently hailed as a potential model for monu-
ment conflicts elsewhere.81 Nevertheless, conflicts remain over
South African monuments—ranging from an almond hedge, to a
monolith built to commemorate a colonial battle, to an agricultural
archaeological site—all charged in various ways with the country’s
colonial and apartheid past.82 And throughout central and eastern
Europe, monuments tied to the Communist Era and World War II
remain divisive despite a wide and varied range of legal pro-
tections.83
In other words, many places besides the United States are also
marked by bitter fights over monuments and controversial mon-
ument-protection laws, including countries that take a more inte-
grated legal approach to both built and natural monuments. But
78. Ley de la Memoria Histórica art. 15 (B.O.E. 2007, 310) (Spain).
79. See, e.g., Rodrigo Casteleiro García, El Arco de la Discordia, EL PAÍS (Jan. 3, 2017,
5:45 PM), https://elpais.com/ccaa/2017/01/02/madrid/1483370786_958217.html [https://perma.
cc/7TFH-LMKF] (discussing ongoing conflict over Francoist monuments including the Valley
of the Fallen and the Victory Arch).
80. National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999 § 3(1)-(2) (S. Afr.).
81. See, e.g., Deborah Douglas, In Dealing with Confederate Monuments, South Africa
Provides a Model, CHI. REP. (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.chicagoreporter.com/in-dealing-with-
confederate-monuments-south-africa-provides-a-model/ [https://perma.cc/D3H9-JW75].
82. Andrea Durbach, Cultural Heritage as Transformation: A Study of Four Sites from
Post-Apartheid South Africa, in HERITAGE, CULTURE AND RIGHTS: CHALLENGING LEGAL
DISCOURSES 205, 212-17 (Andrea Durbach & Lucas Lixinski eds., 2017).
83. Matthew Luxmoore, Poles Apart: The Bitter Conflict over a Nation’s Communist
History, GUARDIAN (July 13, 2018, 1:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/
jul/13/poles-apart-the-bitter-conflict-over-a-nations-history-poland-monuments-communism-
soviet-union [https://perma.cc/V765-LYHT]; see also Rick Lyman, Political Rage over Statues?
Old News in the Old World, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
08/17/world/europe/european-monuments-statues-communism.html [https://perma.cc/S7FL-
3BHD] (discussing monument conflicts and legal changes relevant to these conflicts in a
number of European countries).
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American monument conflicts are unusual in many ways, as Part
I of this Article will show. Part of what makes American monument
conflicts unusual is the distinctively American ambivalence about
protecting monuments in general—a pendulum that swings between
the desire to pick out natural and historic spaces as special to the
narrative of a relatively young country, and the desire to build over
that which is old or received from others in order to focus on a rela-
tively young country’s present and future. Part I.A discusses the
origins of American attitudes about monuments, describing pre-
Revolutionary monument conflicts and the broad suspicion of mon-
umental impulses in the history of the young Republic. Part I.B
tracks changing attitudes about monuments in America in the nine-
teenth century through the origins of America’s first monument-
protection laws, which will be analyzed in greater depth in Parts II
and III.
A. Revolutionary Skepticism and Early Conflicts over American
Monuments
Americans may fight about monuments more frequently than
ever before, but the history of conflict over American monuments
dates back to the earliest days of the American Revolution. In April
1770, a gilded lead statue of King George III on a horse was ded-
icated at the Bowling Green at the southern tip of Manhattan in
order to memorialize “the deep Sense this Colony has of the eminent
and singular Blessings received from him during his most auspi-
cious Reign.”84 At the time it was built, the monument to King
George was the only equestrian statue in what would become the
United States.85 Notwithstanding the deep sense of devotion noted
at the dedication, the statue was subject to vandalism almost as
soon as it was erected, and a wrought iron fence marked with the
royal insignia was installed around it in 1771.86 Despite the fence,
an antigraffiti and antidesecration ordinance passed in 1773 to
protect the statue, and despite sporadic nearby demonstrations in
84. Arthur S. Marks, The Statue of King George III in New York and the Iconology of
Regicide, 13 AM. ART J. 61, 61 (1981).
85. SAVAGE, supra note 69, at 37.
86. Marks, supra note 84, at 65.
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support of the monument and George III’s continued reign by the
“better sort of people,” vandalism of the monument continued to
occur in the following years.87
On July 9, 1776, soon after the Declaration of Independence was
read publicly in New York, a crowd of citizens with revolutionary
impulses marched down to the Bowling Green, defaced and then
scaled the fence, dragged the statue to the ground, smashed and
sawed it to bits, and then melted down most of the bits.88 Three days
later, Ebenezer Hazard, who had been appointed postmaster of New
York by the Continental Congress, wrote to General Horatio Gates
of the Continental Army. In his letter to Gates, Hazard included a
copy of the newly signed Declaration of Independence along with the
news about the statue’s destruction.89 In particular, Hazard wrote
Gates that the King’s statue had been pulled down and destroyed
“to make musket ball of, so that [the King’s] troops will probably
have melted Majesty fired at them.”90
While the original statue is gone, the wrought iron fence that was
constructed to protect the statue remains—albeit still scarred from
the forcible removal of the royal insignia that originally decorated
it.91 Like the statue of Christopher Columbus that now stands in the
middle of Columbus Circle, the scarred fence around Bowling Green
is currently listed on the National Register of Historic Places and as
a New York state landmark.92 It bears witness to the longstanding
suspicion of, and occasionally destructive impulses toward, monu-
ments that have simmered away throughout American history, even
87. HOLGER HOOCK, EMPIRES OF THE IMAGINATION: POLITICS, WAR, AND THE ARTS IN THE
BRITISH WORLD, 1750-1850, at 49-51 (2010) (quoting MORNING CHRON., Feb. 4, 1775).
88. Marks, supra note 84, at 65-66. Similar monuments to royal authority were destroyed
with similar sentiments throughout the thirteen colonies in the summer of 1776. See, e.g.,
HOOCK, supra note 87, at 52.
89. Letter from Ebenezer Hazard to General Gates (July 12, 1776), in AMERICAN
ARCHIVES: CONSISTING OF A COLLECTION OF AUTHENTICK RECORDS, STATE PAPERS, DEBATES,
AND LETTERS AND OTHER NOTICES OF PUBLICK AFFAIRS 227, 227-28 (1843); see also Fred
Shelley, Ebenezer Hazard: America’s First Historical Editor, 12 WM. & MARY Q. 44, 52 (1955).
90. Letter from Ebenezer Hazard to General Gates, supra note 89, at 228.
91. David W. Dunlap, Greening Ye Olde Manhattan, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2004), https://
www.nytimes.com/2004/07/09/arts/greening-ye-olde-manhattan.html [https://perma.cc/ZH69-
3M3T].
92. Honan, supra note 18; see infra notes 193-94 and accompanying text (discussing
records of listings).
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as their survival and present protection reveal the strength of mon-
umental impulses in America today.
The brief life and abrupt end of George III’s Manhattan statue
show that American monuments have always provided a cauldron
for conflict, and that legal efforts to protect controversial monu-
ments are older than the Republic. But American ideas about what
counts as a monument, whether monuments are worthy of protec-
tion, and how monuments should be protected have changed a great
deal since George III’s statue was melted down for munitions—as
the much longer story of the statue’s now-monumental fence shows.
For a number of reasons, including but not limited to their rejec-
tion of the trappings and memorials to the British monarchy, many
in the Revolutionary generation were hostile to many kinds of civic
memorials or any kind of public monuments, seeing them as an
obstacle to the new Republic’s proper orientation toward the
immediate needs of the present and an idealized conception of the
future.93 Early America’s widespread skepticism about the value of
historic monuments was perhaps best articulated by James
Madison, who suggested that it was part of “the glory of the people
of America” that they did not suffer a “veneration for antiquity, for
custom, or for names” to contradict “the suggestions of their own
good sense” or “the lessons of their own experience.”94 More bluntly
than Madison, at the beginning of the nineteenth century North
Carolina Congressman Nathaniel Macon stated that “monuments
are good for nothing,” arguing that it would be far better to devote
public funds to educate the poor rather than to build a public memo-
rial to George Washington.95
A few decades later, Missouri’s future senator and governor
Benjamin Gratz Brown96 celebrated the fact that history’s lessons
were lost on Americans in equally direct terms. “With the Past we
have literally nothing to do,” Brown claimed, because for Americans,
93. See, e.g., KAMMEN, supra note 11, at 41-45 (gathering sources and noting that “[t]he
vehemence with which the past was rejected” in the United States, even seventy years after
the Revolution, “is astonishing”).
94. THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, at 52 (James Madison) (Jacob Gideon ed., 1847).
95. 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 803-04 (1800).
96. See Brown, Benjamin Gratz, (1826-1885), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S. CONG.,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=b000905 [https://perma.cc/CA6W-
UDEQ].
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“[p]recedents have lost their virtue and all their authority is gone.”97
Brown was not alone in these views. For many Americans, focusing
on the past, or seeking to memorialize it through monuments, could
only sap the young nation’s unique vitality. It was “for other
nations,” lost in their “garrulous” old age, to “muse over the history
of their youthful exploits.”98 Writing as a critical observer of this
early American tendency—which he thought was a great and
“incurable ... vice of democracy”—John Quincy Adams tried to sum
up the skeptical attitudes of many early Americans, writing that
“[d]emocracy has no monuments” because “its very essence is
iconoclastic.”99 In particular, Adams believed that his country was
too “swallowed up in the present” to worry about creating markers
commemorating the past.100
B. The Growth of American Monuments and the Roots of
American Monument-Protection Laws
Nothing better illustrates the enduring suspicion of built memo-
rials to historical figures in early America than the prolonged
debates over where to bury George Washington, and whether some
sort of monument should be connected with his burial site. Wash-
ington himself approved a plan to have his remains buried under-
neath an equestrian statue in the middle of the Capitol building at
the exact center of Washington, D.C.101 After his death, Federalists
sought to bury him outside the Capitol, in a mausoleum modeled
after an Egyptian pyramid that was designed to be taller than the
height of the Capitol itself.102 But all of these ideas were rejected by
Congress after the watershed election of 1800.103 The proposed
mausoleum was rejected as a “useless pyramid,” and for many years
97. FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 355 (1921) (quoting
Brown at length).
98. James Kirke Paulding, The American Naval Chronicle, 6 ANALECTIC MAG. 231, 249
(1815); see also LOWENTHAL, supra note 11, at 188-92 (gathering sources).
99. 8 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, COMPRISING PORTIONS OF HIS DIARY FROM 1795
TO 1848, at 433 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1876) [hereinafter MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY
ADAMS].
100. Id.
101. SAVAGE, supra note 69, at 38.
102. Id. at 39-42.
103. Id. at 43.
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the only monument to Washington in the nation’s capital was the
city itself, “a Living, Intelligent Monument of Glory” to the first
President.104
Congress’s rejection of the initial plans for Washington’s mauso-
leum did not stop the conflict over whether and how to honor
Washington in the nation’s capital. For example, in 1841 Horace
Greenough’s statue of Washington, seminude in a toga and seated
on a throne like a god from classical antiquity, was installed in the
Capitol—it was, in fact, the first completed federal monument of
any sort.105 The statue was originally installed in the center of the
Capitol, but it was so widely hated that it was later moved to a less
conspicuous site,106 and today it is widely regarded as one of the
most mocked public monuments ever erected in America.107
At a certain point, however, the deliberate repudiation of the past
created during the Revolutionary Era and fostered during the early
nineteenth century began to turn on itself, and a desire for histori-
cal monuments began to spread throughout the American public,
along with a renewed interest in history as a civic good.108 But the
progress of this new monumental enthusiasm was fitful. For
example, the Washington Monument on the National Mall was not
begun until 1848, and not completed until almost two decades after
the Civil War in 1884: its sluggish progress and lukewarm recep-
tion reflected Americans’ lingering ambivalence about lasting mon-
Suments.109
Beyond the narrow debate over whether and how to commemo-
rate Washington, this gradual shift in American attitudes toward
monuments can also be tracked through the growth of rural ceme-
teries with monumental art throughout the country.110 This boom in
104. The Memory of Gen. Washington, WASH. CITY WKLY. GAZETTE, Nov. 25, 1815, at 4; see
also MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, supra note 99, at 433 (deploring the absence of a
monument to Washington).
105. SAVAGE, supra note 69, at 49-50.
106. See Letter to the Editor, Washington, CIN. WKLY. HERALD & PHILANTHROPIST, Jan. 31,
1844 (calling the monument “a ridiculous affair” that “only excites laughter” rather than
admiration).
107. See, e.g., SAVAGE, supra note 69, at 49-50.
108. See KAMMEN, supra note 11, at 65, 69-71 (describing the emerging “crisis of identity”
in mid-nineteenth-century America caused by the ongoing “repudiation of the past”).
109. SAVAGE, supra note 69, at 54-60, 134.
110. See Alfred L. Brophy, “These Great and Beautiful Republics of the Dead”:
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American monument construction in the nineteenth century was
due in part to the aging Revolutionary and Civil War generations
seeking to commemorate both the most memorable events of their
lives and the most significant events in the early history of the
country.111 But more was at work in the growth of public monu-
ments than a combination of nostalgia and generational intimations
of mortality.
For example, as Al Brophy has shown, the nineteenth-century
wave of rural monumental cemeteries was designed to inculcate
republican virtues of patience, order, devotion, and patriotism in a
changing nation.112 These “monuments of the dead” were intended
to “keep watch for the living,” thereby providing indelible markers
of exemplary behavior and collective memory and “binding together
the fabric of society.”113 But frequently these new monumental
cemeteries were created with more loaded messages in mind as well.
Many were intended to evoke an idealized conception of the coun-
try’s agricultural past, and some were dedicated to act as counter-
weights to the perceived moral messages broadcast by the
“mammon-serving and tumultuous cit[ies]” growing rapidly across
the country.114 Over time, the messaging associated with some of
these new cemeteries became more overt, political, and specific,
ranging from the promotion of both Whig and Republican constitu-
tional ideals115 to the cultivation of an enduring attachment to the
Confederacy and the promotion of the Lost Cause mythology.116
Constitutionalism and the Antebellum Cemetery 13, 27-28 (UNC Legal Studies Research Paper
No. 2304305, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2304305 [https://
perma.cc/68MD-QW8J] (noting that the “era of the creation of the rural cemetery was also the
era of monuments to the American revolutionary generation” and that the nineteenth- century
growth of rural cemeteries was “closely linked to the erection of monuments to the past”).
111. KAMMEN, supra note 11, at 115.
112. See Brophy, supra note 110, at 19-46.
113. See id. at 19, 29-30 (quoting DEDICATION OF THE BELLEFONTAINE CEMETERY: ADDRESS
OF PROFESSOR POST, AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS ON THAT OCCASION (St. Louis, T.W. Ustick
1851)); see also KAMMEN, supra note 11, at 274 (noting that new American cemeteries “often
were regarded as shrines where local history ... might be reflected upon”).
114. Brophy, supra note 110, at 25-31 (quoting Ornamental Cemeteries, 21 YALE LITERARY
MAG. 45, 50 (1855)).
115. See generally id. (reviewing seventy cemetery dedication addresses from 1831 to 1863).
116. See, e.g., CAROLINE E. JANNEY, BURYING THE DEAD BUT NOT THE PAST: LADIES’
MEMORIAL ASSOCIATIONS AND THE LOST CAUSE 199 (2008).
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Like the monumental character of Washington, D.C., the ex-
pansion of new monumental cemeteries in the nineteenth century
tracked the changing nature of American attitudes toward built
monuments. By the second half of the nineteenth century, public
spaces around the country began to fill up with statues and other
memorials to war dead and historical figures important to the
nation’s changing conception of itself.117 The period from roughly
1880 through 1920 saw an unprecedented burst of monument
construction—it was during this period, along with the last few
decades, that Americans built most of the monuments that fill the
country’s civic spaces today.118 Indeed, prior to the second half of
the nineteenth century, Americans largely lacked a well-defined
conception of public space—and still less did they see public spaces
in their cities as places well-suited for built monuments.119
By the second half of the nineteenth century, the sentiment
expressed by Justice Durfee was much more widely shared than at
the time of the Revolution. Many felt that the country needed more
monuments to bind the nation together and express a distinctively
American view of its history and culture. Jared C. Markham, who
designed a monument for Saratoga Battlefield that was erected
during this period, captured these attitudes in a long pamphlet that
he wrote to accompany the monument’s dedication.120 Instead of
building on past models, Markham believed that America’s demo-
cratic character meant that American monuments had a special
charge: like the country’s constitution and its laws, they should
grow out of the “history and spirit” of the American people rather
than their rulers, expressing a “high tone and spirit, a pride of
nationality, and a pure and lofty patriotism.”121
Just as Americans’ attitudes toward built monuments were
changing, Americans’ attitudes toward natural and archaeological
117. See, e.g., Sally Greene, Judge Thomas Ruffin and the Shadows of Southern History,
17 S. CULTURES 66, 67 (2011) (noting that in the last two decades of the nineteenth century,
the focus of built monuments “shifted from cemeteries ... to public spaces, as dutiful citizens
heeded a more partisan call”).
118. Upton, supra note 15, at 19-20.
119. SAVAGE, supra note 69, at 64-66.
120. JARED C. MARKHAM, NATIONAL ART MONUMENTAL (1886) (unpaginated, on file with
author); see also KAMMEN, supra note 11, at 163-64 (discussing Markham’s work and situating
it among other American theorists working with monuments from 1870-1915).
121. MARKHAM, supra note 120.
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monuments went through a similar transformation during the mid-
to late nineteenth century. In colonial America and through the
early decades of the nineteenth century, many of the natural
landmarks, ecological resources, and historic sites now protected as
national monuments would not have been recognized as monumen-
tal at all. Indeed, many of today’s national monuments would not
even have been recognized as valuable in the early Republic.122
To be sure, during the Revolution and for decades thereafter,
Americans frequently drew favorable contrasts between the natural
resources and wild places of their new country and the man-made
monuments of Europe.123 Americans have always had an affinity for
certain natural features—for example, the history of monumental
trees in this country dates back to colonial times.124 Indeed, whether
they served as monuments to specific events in the past or as a mon-
umental connection with a mythic or idealized America, monumen-
tal trees in this country were seen as a substitute, in part, for the
dearth of built monuments in nineteenth-century America.125
Although Americans “have neither old castles nor old associations,”
wrote a famous nineteenth-century architect and landscape de-
signer, “we have at least ... old trees that can teach us lessons ... not
less instructive and poetical than the ruins of a past age.”126
But despite the longstanding resonance of monumental trees and
certain other types of natural landmarks, colonial Americans and
Americans in the early Republic frequently saw nature as a hostile,
even demonic, other—something to be tamed by the forces of
agriculture and industry. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries this left little room for recognizing natural wonders as
122. See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: THE SOCIAL INFLUENCE OF
DEMOCRACY 78 (Henry Reeve trans., 1840) (“[T]he Americans ... are insensible to the wonders
of inanimate nature” but are instead focused solely on “subduing nature.”).
123. See, e.g., KAMMEN, supra note 11, at 44-45 (gathering sources and noting that Amer-
icans “repeatedly insisted that natural wonders and antiquities in the United States were
superior to their man-made counterparts in the Old World”).
124. SAVAGE, supra note 69, at 91-94; see also supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text
(discussing the importance of monumental trees in America).
125. See SAVAGE, supra note 69, at 91-94.
126. A.J. DOWNING, RURAL ESSAYS 164-165 (George William Curtis ed., 1853); see also
SAVAGE, supra note 69, at 91-94 (discussing the work of Downing and others and noting the
“special resonance” of memorial trees in America, which have always carried “much of the
formal power of columns, obelisks, or pyramids”).
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anything but obstacles, let alone preserving them as monuments.127
Beyond seeing unusual natural features as potential obstacles to
material progress, certain aspects of the natural world also had
sinister symbolic significance, and therefore many early Americans
saw spiritual value in transforming the nature’s rugged features
into cultivated land.128 By the mid-nineteenth century, however,
attitudes towards the distinctive natural features of the American
landscape had begun to change. From the widespread sale of pop-
ular prints of landscape paintings and dime novels emphasizing
undeveloped nature, to the growing popularity of the work of
Thoreau and Emerson, nineteenth-century Americans began to cel-
ebrate the distinctive features of American nature as substitutes for
the built monumental landscapes of older countries.129
A similar transformation in attitudes towards Native American
history and the continent’s preconquest past occurred in the mid-
nineteenth century.130 Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, the
value of archaeological sites was at least as remote as the value of
natural wonders to many Americans.131 Public art such as the orig-
inal reliefs in the Capitol Rotunda, and literature such as Long-
fellow’s Hiawatha, helped kindle interest in Native American and
early colonial histories—albeit in selective, highly stylized, one-
sided, and frequently racist versions of those histories—while a few
nineteenth-century scholars began to express an interest in under-
standing Native American cultural traditions and preserving Native
American artifacts.132 By the late nineteenth century, the Archae-
ological Institute of North America was founded, and historical
127. See, e.g., DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 122, at 78 (suggesting that Americans in the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries did not notice natural wonders because “[t]heir
eyes [were] fixed upon” the march of their own progress).
128. See, e.g., RODERICK FRAZIER NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND 24-25, 31-35
(5th ed. 2014).
129. See, e.g., KAMMEN, supra note 11, at 44-45 (gathering sources and tracing the origins
of the national parks and monuments system to this emerging mid-nineteenth-century inter-
est in natural wonders and historic sites).
130. See id. at 184-88.
131. See, e.g., Robert L. Schuyler, The History of American Archaeology: An Examination
of Procedure, 36 AM. ANTIQUITY 383, 384-85 (1971) (noting that systematic study of and
interest in archaeological sites in America did not emerge until the mid-nineteenth century).
132. See, e.g., KAMMEN, supra note 11, at 82-87.
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societies began lobbying Congress to preserve vulnerable American
archaeological sites.133
Many of the monument-protection laws that still affect American
lives and landscapes date to this first great period of monument
creation that stretched around the turn of the twentieth century.
For example, in 1904 Virginia passed the first version of its state
statue law,134 and in 1906 Congress passed the Antiquities Act135—
both of which will be discussed at greater length below—and Amer-
icans continued to develop monument-protection laws throughout
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.136 As a result, Americans’
evolving attitudes toward monuments have become inseparable
from the laws that Americans have established to protect them.
While American enthusiasm for monuments crested at the turn
of the twentieth century, it did not remain static. In the mid-
twentieth century, a gradual backlash to these widespread monu-
mental impulses emerged, which drew upon both the long-standing
tradition of American skepticism about monuments137 as well as
anger about how the new monument-protection laws were being
used.138 By the late twentieth century the pendulum had swung
back again. As noted above, Americans today are living through a
second great wave of enthusiasm for monuments, built and natural,
even if the forms of these monuments are sometimes different than
those that have come before, and even though monuments and the
laws that protect them generate more intense controversy than ever
before.139
133. Id. at 184-85; see also LEE, supra note 68, at 4-7 (discussing the founding of the
Archeological Institute of North America).
134. Act of Feb. 19, 1904, 1904 Va. Acts 62.
135. Antiquities Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-209, 34 Stat. 225 (codified as amended at 54
U.S.C. §§ 320301-320303 (2012)).
136. See infra Part II (discussing the evolution of the statue statutes, the NHPA, and its
predecessor statutes).
137. See, e.g., Lewis Mumford, The Death of the Monument, in CIRCLE: INTERNATIONAL
SURVEY OF CONSTRUCTIVE ART 263, 263-270 (J. L. Martin et al. eds., 1937).
138. See, e.g., LEE, supra note 68, at 98, 105 (detailing the bitter opposition to President
Roosevelt’s proclamation of the Jackson Hole National Monument in 1943 and President
Eisenhower’s proclamation of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal National Monument in 1961).
139. See Upton, supra note 15, at 21 (tracing the beginnings of “[t]he current monument-
building era” to the dedication in 1982 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial in Washington,
D.C.).
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While Americans remain of two minds about monuments, what
has changed since the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is
the number of laws that protect monuments—many of which date
back to this first era of monumental enthusiasm. This means that
any understanding of contemporary American monument conflicts
depends on understanding these laws. Parts II and III below focus
on some of the most important and controversial monument-
protection laws, paying particular attention to the state statue
statutes, the NHPA, and the Antiquities Act.
II. THE POWER OF PASTNESS: BUILT MONUMENTS IN AMERICA AND
THE LAWS THAT PROTECT THEM
By the turn of the twentieth century, Americans held very
different attitudes toward built monuments than previous
generations—instead of rejecting such memorials, many Americans
decided that they wanted their civic landscapes to reflect the
presence of valued historical figures and the power of pastness.140
The public spaces of American cities began to fill up with statues
and pedestals, and Congress and state legislatures began crafting
legislation to protect the new monuments.141 Two statutory schemes
are particularly important to understand the past and present of
American laws that protect built monuments.
Part II.A begins by examining the statue statutes, a series of
state laws designed to protect Confederate monuments in some
southern states. As will be seen below, these laws are constitution-
ally suspect because they are intertwined with the same history of
racial oppression that surrounds the monuments they protect.142
While the oldest statue statute dates back to the turn of the twen-
tieth century, most are of more recent vintage, and all have proven
to be particularly controversial in recent years.
The second statute that is critically important to understand the
history and present status of American monument-protection laws
140. Cf. KAMMEN, supra note 11, at 42 (discussing changing American attitudes about how
much power should reside in “pastness”).
141. See supra Part I.B.
142. See, e.g., Alexander Tsesis, The Problem of Confederate Symbols: A Thirteenth
Amendment Approach, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 539, 599 (2002) (“[L]egislation that codifies the
display of monuments” to the Confederacy “sends an exclusionary social message.”).
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is the NHPA. The NHPA is a statute that stretches far beyond
monument protection alone: it is the keystone of American historic
preservation law more generally,143 and in addition to conventional
monuments, its ambit covers everything from historic houses to
battlefields to radio telescopes to narrow-gauge railroads high in the
mountains.144
Part II.B explores the history of the NHPA and its application to
monuments, while Part II.C compares the NHPA to the statue
statutes—a valuable comparison for a number of reasons. First, a
comparison of the statue statutes with the NHPA reveals that the
statue statutes have many other defects beyond their potential
constitutional weaknesses and their troubling history, which may
be useful to convince those who are not willing to confront this
troubling history. Moreover, a comparison of the NHPA with the
statue statutes shows that the NHPA can be used in problematic
ways that echo, even if they do not equal, the problems caused by
the statue statutes. In other words, the statue statutes can serve
as a cautionary example for future action taken by federal, state,
and local actors under the NHPA.
A. The Many Fatal Flaws of the Statue Statutes
The oldest American monument-protection laws predate the
Revolution,145 but many of the most controversial monument-
protection laws are of relatively recent vintage. The statue statutes
that attempt to protect Confederate monuments in a number of
southeastern states represent both sides of this history. The first
statue statute was passed over a century ago,146 before every other
monument-protection law discussed in detail in this Article, but
most of the other statue statutes are of much more recent vintage.147
143. See, e.g., SARA C. BRONIN & J. PETER BYRNE, HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW 17 (2012)
(noting that the NHPA “is a sweeping federal law that forms the heart of our federal pres-
ervation regime”).
144. See 36 C.F.R. § 60.3 (2018) (providing examples of locations protected by the NHPA).
145. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text (discussing colonial New York City’s
monument-protection law).
146. Act of Feb. 19, 1904, 1904 Va. Acts 62.
147. See, e.g., Alabama Memorial Preservation Act of 2017, 2017 Ala. Laws 1109 (codified
at ALA. CODE §§ 41-9-230 to -237 (2017)).
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Eight states have statue statutes on the books: Alabama, Georgia,
Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee,
and Virginia.148 While the statue statutes were drafted at different
times and in response to different events, each shares many of the
following characteristics.149
First, most of the statue statutes were drafted to protect a wide
range of monuments throughout their respective states, with little
or no opportunity for local input, and little or no consideration of
individual local circumstances, history, or impact. For example,
Georgia’s statute protects all publicly owned monuments associated
with Confederate or United States military service, regardless of the
public entity that owns them, and it expressly prohibits any local
government official from attempting to remove or conceal such a
monument.150 The exclusion of any local input or nuance is particu-
larly noteworthy in Georgia’s statute because it also singles out the
massive state-owned monument to the Confederacy at Stone Moun-
tain for special protection151—even though the statute makes no
provision for diverse or changing local circumstances for other
Confederate monuments.
In addition, enforcement of the statue statutes has reinforced this
disregard for local concerns. States have articulated sweeping
intrastate preemption arguments in an attempt to exclude all local
efforts to modify or alter protected monuments, even efforts that
comply with the letter of the statue statutes.152 In sum, both the
design and the attempts to enforce the statue statutes deliberately
exclude local governments, community groups, and individual citi-
zens, focusing instead on protecting an entire class of monuments
regardless of how they affect those around them.153
A second characteristic shared by most of the statue statutes
relates to the disconnect between their facial language and their
148. ALA. CODE §§ 41-9-230 to -231; GA. CODE ANN. § 50-3-1 (2019); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 171.780-.788 (West 2019); MISS. CODE ANN. § 55-15-81 (2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 100-2.1
(2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1-165 (2019); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-412 (2019); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 15.2-1812 (2019).
149. See Bray, supra note 23, at 23-44 (providing a comprehensive survey of the statue
statutes).
150. GA. CODE ANN. § 50-3-1(b)(1)-(2).
151. See id. § 50-3-1(c).
152. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 60, at 2.
153. See Bray, supra note 23, at 6-8, 11.
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true purpose. All of the statue statutes ostensibly protect a wide
range of built monuments ranging across American history. For
example, in addition to protecting monuments built to commemo-
rate the “War Between the States,” Tennessee’s statue statute also
protects monuments built to commemorate military conflicts rang-
ing from the French and Indian War to Operation El Dorado
Canyon.154 Yet there can be no doubt that these statutes were
designed and passed in order to protect Confederate monuments in
particular,155 for a host of reasons that go beyond the general dearth
of American monuments and American monument conflicts over the
1755 Battle of the Monongahela or the 1986 bombing campaign in
Libya.
In Tennessee, for example, the statue statute was hailed by the
Tennessee Division of the Sons of Confederate Veterans (SCV) as
“one of the greatest documents in modern history” because it was
“clearly” designed to protect Confederate monuments throughout
the state.156 The enthusiasm expressed by the Tennessee SCV for
the statue statute was no coincidence, because the statue statute
bill was introduced into both houses of the Tennessee legislature by
members of the Tennessee SCV.157 Moreover, despite the wide range
of monuments that they ostensibly protect, the statue statutes have
been invoked almost without exception to protect Confederate
monuments.158 And these rare exceptions serve only to prove the
general rule: South Carolina’s statue statute was invoked to protect
other types of monuments, but only once, and then only to prevent
changes to racially segregated monuments to fallen soldiers from
World War I and II.159
154. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-412(a)(2), (b)(1).
155. See Bray, supra note 23, at 23-41 (reviewing the legislative history behind each statue
statute).
156. Chuck Demastus, Tennessee Passes Heritage Protection Act, S. HERITAGE NEWS &
VIEWS (May 11, 2013, 11:09 AM), http://shnv.blogspot.com/2013/05/tennessee-passes-heritage-
protection-act.html [https://perma.cc/G7QT-K65Q].
157. See id.; see also Liliana Segura, Forrest the Butcher: Memphis Wants to Remove a
Statue Honoring First Grand Wizard of the KKK, INTERCEPT (Sept. 2, 2017, 8:00 AM),
https://theintercept.com/2017/09/02/memphis-wants-to-remove-statue-honoring-kkk-grand-
wizard-nathan-bedford-forrest/ [https://perma.cc/3KYJ-LQR3] (quoting the authors of the bill).
158. See Bray, supra note 23, at 7-8.
159. Alan Blinder, Change to a Segregated Monument Is Stymied by a Law Protecting It,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/01/us/south-carolina-city-would-
remove-segregated-war-memorial-but.html [https://perma.cc/NQU8-6YP2].
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These enforcement patterns suggest a third common character-
istic: these statutes are intertwined with the same painful history
of racial segregation, intimidation, and violence that infuses many
of the monuments that the statutes are designed to protect. All
monuments can become charged with troubling meaning over time,
and many other monuments beyond the Confederate memorials
discussed here may have carried offensive characteristics that were
obscured by imperfect historical understanding and education.160
But the history of Confederate monuments in this country is un-
usually tragic, and even a cursory examination of their history
reveals a deliberate association with both slavery and the system-
atic and violent racial discrimination that survived the Civil War.161
As a recent comprehensive report from the Southern Poverty Law
Center shows, Confederate monuments were erected in two distinct
periods. The first occurred from 1900 through the 1920s, as Jim
Crow laws were enacted and the Ku Klux Klan was reborn, and the
second began after the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board
of Education, as southern states went through massive resistance
to desegregation.162 Although the connection between Confederate
monuments and institutionalized discrimination and violence has
become ever clearer, thoughtful observers have always understood
that much of this country’s public commemoration to the Confeder-
acy was designed to help perpetuate the work of Jim Crow and the
Klan.163
Most, though not all, of the statue statutes were enacted decades
after the monuments they seek to protect, but their true focus on
Confederate monuments means that they are inextricably inter-
twined with this troubled history—so much so that many scholars
have argued that these statutes are unconstitutional.164 One of these
160. See BOOTH GUNTER ET AL., S. POVERTY L. CTR., WHOSE HERITAGE? PUBLIC SYMBOLS
OF THE CONFEDERACY 5-6 (Booth Gunter ed., 2016).
161. See, e.g., Tsesis, supra note 142, at 598 (arguing that “statues dedicated to the
Confederacy’s chief ideologues” support the “attitudes and deeds of the Old South” and “its
entrenched separatism between races”).
162. See GUNTER ET AL., supra note 160, at 8-9, 17-35 (documenting all public spaces
dedicated to the Confederacy, including when they were created).
163. See, e.g., W.E.B. DuBois, Postscript, 40 CRISIS 278, 279 (1931) (noting the connection
between Confederate monuments, “the rules of ‘Jim-Crow,’” and the “custom” of vigilante
racist murder).
164. See Bray, supra note 23, at 13-14, 16-19 (reviewing several of the arguments about the
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arguments focuses on the exclusionary social message that the
statue statutes provide,165 a message that both amplifies and adds
an official imprimatur to the exclusionary messages represented by
the monuments themselves. For some, the message presented by the
statutes is so powerfully exclusionary and stigmatizing that it is
unconstitutional because it directly undermines the Thirteenth
Amendment’s abolition of slavery and involuntary servitude.166
Other scholars argue that the statue statutes are unconstitutional
because the statutes compel local governments to voice a problem-
atic and exclusionary message, often against their own wishes,
thereby violating the First Amendment rights of these communities
and their citizens.167 Still others claim that the statue statutes are
unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds because, much like
unconstitutional flag-burning ordinances, they constrain the free
speech acts of those who might wish to protest Confederate monu-
ments’ continued existence.168 Finally, some scholars argue that the
statue statutes are unconstitutional because they force local
governments into exclusionary expressive conduct that violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.169 These
arguments are currently working their way through a number of
courts. It is too early to judge how effective these arguments may
be— although at least one court thus far has been receptive to some
of these arguments, and that decision was reversed on appeal.170
The constitutional infirmity that attaches to many of the statue
statutes is connected to a fourth shared characteristic: many of
these statutes were passed or amended in haste, especially those
that were passed shortly after the alteration or removal of other
constitutionality of the statue statutes).
165. See Tsesis, supra note 142, at 599.
166. See id. at 599-600.
167. See Aneil Kovvali, Confederate Statute Removal, 70 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 82, 83
(2017).
168. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Debate over Confederate Monuments, TAKE
CARE (Aug. 25, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/the-debate-over-confederate-monuments
[https://perma.cc/7793-ZKYY].
169. See Micah Schwartzman & Nelson Tebbe, Charlottesville’s Monuments Are Uncon-
stitutional, SLATE (Aug. 25, 2017, 9:07 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/08/
charlottesvilles-monuments-are-unconstitutional.html [https://perma.cc/ZZG2-ADUU].
170. State v. City of Birmingham, No. 01-CV-2017-903426.00, slip op. at 3-7 (Ala. Cir. Ct.
Jan. 14, 2019), rev’d, No. CV-17-903426, 2019 WL 6337424 (Ala. Nov. 27, 2019).
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Confederate symbols, and thus their constitutional implications
were not fully considered.171 For example, North Carolina’s statue
statute was passed just weeks after Confederate flags and other
symbols were removed from state capitols of neighboring states
following the June 2015 Charleston church massacre.172 In addition
to the potential constitutional issues outlined above, North
Carolina’s rush to pass its statue statute has since been condemned
by local governments, community groups, and university officials
who have argued that it stripped them of discretion to resolve sub-
sequent monument conflicts without property destruction and
violence.173
North Carolina’s example is far from isolated: many other statue
statutes were passed or amended in haste in recent years.174 The
hasty passage and amendment of many statue statutes leads to a
fifth shared characteristic: many of these statutes were passed so
quickly that they contain many practical flaws, providing local
governments with the ability to remove or alter protected monu-
ments while complying with the statutes.175 In other words, in
addition to their suspect constitutional foundation and the undue
burdens they place on many local governments, many of the statue
171. See, e.g., Sterling, supra note 41 (quoting Alabama State Senator Hank Sanders, an
opponent of Alabama’s statue statute, who criticized the legislation as being too hasty and
“not thought through”).
172. The June 2015 massacre at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in
Charleston, South Carolina, was committed by a gunman who draped himself in the Con-
federate flag and other Confederate memorabilia on social media. See, e.g., Nick Corasaniti
et al., Church Massacre Suspect Held as Charleston Grieves, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/19/us/charleston-church-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/
6YGM-2MJA]; see also Bray, supra note 23, at 7-8, 41 (discussing the Charleston massacre
and gathering sources connecting South Carolina’s subsequent flag removal to North
Carolina’s statue statute).
173. See, e.g., Statement from Former Members of UNC-Chapel Hill Board of Trustees,
HIGHER ED WORKS (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.higheredworks.org/2019/01/unc-board-of-
trustees/ [https://perma.cc/VG5B-GKRX] (condemning North Carolina’s “hastily passed”
statue statute).
174. See Bray, supra note 23, at 23-44 (gathering sources and describing the rushed
passage of statue statutes in other states after threats of monument removal or racist
violence).
175. See, e.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans Nathan Bedford Forrest Camp 215 v. City of
Memphis, No. 18-29-III, slip op. at 2-4, 14 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. May 16, 2018), aff’d, No. M2018-
01096-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 2355332 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 4, 2019), appeal denied, (Tenn.
Oct. 14, 2019) (concluding that Memphis’s conveyance of protected monuments to a private
entity that then removed them was lawful under Tennessee’s statue statute).
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statutes are so shoddily drafted that when put to the test, they do
not protect Confederate monuments nearly as effectively as their
supporters may have hoped.176 Through a comparison with the
NHPA, Part II.C below will explore additional deficiencies in the
statue statutes beyond their troubling history, constitutional infir-
mities, and the many practical deficiencies pointed out by previous
work. But first it will be necessary to explore the NHPA in Part II.B.
B. Historical Monuments and the NHPA
Confederate statues and the statutes that protect them are just
one example of the many recent conflicts over built monuments and
monument-protection laws in America. Across the country, a host of
monuments to historic figures built in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries have been altered or removed in recent years,177
while other monuments protected by local, state, or federal law have
remained in place, despite some interest in their alteration or
removal.178 Aside from Confederate memorials, statues honoring
176. Space does not permit a full examination of these practical flaws here. For such an
examination, see Bray, supra note 23, at 20-44.
177. See, e.g., Dominic Fracassa, SF’s Controversial “Early Days” Statue Taken Down
Before Sunrise, S.F. CHRON. (Sept. 14, 2018, 4:52 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/
article/Controversial-S-F-Early-Days-statue-taken-13229418.php [https://perma.cc/XML6-E
X3R]; see also Danny Lewis, Controversial Central Park Statue Will Be Moved, WNYC
(Apr. 16, 2018), https://www.wnyc.org/story/controversial-central-park-statue-will-be-moved/
[https://perma.cc/39T6-K3DY] (discussing New York’s decision to remove a statue honoring
Dr. J. Marion Sims); Julissa Treviño, Monument to a Historic Black Woman Will Replace
Racist Statue in Pittsburgh, SMITHSONIAN (Mar. 20, 2018), https://smithsonianmag.com/
smart-news/pittsburgh-replace-racist-statue-monument-black-woman-180968524/ [https://
perma.cc/6M2D-3Y77] (discussing Pittsburgh’s decision to remove a statue honoring composer
Stephen Foster).
178. See, e.g., Honan, supra note 18 (discussing the monument to Christopher Columbus
in New York’s Columbus Circle, which is now designated in the National Register of Historic
Places); see also Julia Glum, Lincoln Memorial Sprayed with Paint, Profanity Days After
Charlottesville Protests, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 15, 2017, 4:01 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/
lincoln-memorial-vandalized-red-graffiti-651154 [https://perma.cc/2WPR-ETJ4] (describing
repeated protests and damage to the Columbus Memorial Fountain in Washington, D.C.,
which is also on the National Register of Historic Places); Shaun Towne, Christopher
Columbus Statue Vandalized in Providence, WPRI.COM (Oct. 9, 2017, 8:34 PM), https://
www.wpri.com/news/crime/christopher-columbus-statue-vandalized-in-providence
[https://perma.cc/5NKG-7C9R] (describing protests around and damage to the Columbus mon-
ument in Providence, Rhode Island, which is also on the National Register of Historic Places);
Columbus Day Brings Protests to Downtown Pueblo, KRDO.COM (Oct. 9, 2018, 1:09 PM),
https://www.krdo.com/news/2018/10/09/columbus-day-brings-protests-to-downtown-pueblo/
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Christopher Columbus are probably the most frequent specific
flashpoint for monument-related controversy in America today.179
Part B.1 below explores these controversies in connection with
Columbus monuments protected by the NHPA, while Parts B.2 and
B.3 explore the structure and function of the NHPA in more detail,
showing that the Columbus monument controversies are an ex-
ception—though a significant exception—to the way that the NHPA
usually works, and the types of monuments and other historic
properties that it tends to protect.
1. Contemporary Monument Controversies and the NHPA
In addition to the federal holiday associated with Columbus,
monuments to Columbus and place names incorporating his name
are ubiquitous across the country. But in recent decades knowledge
of Columbus’s advocacy and practice of slavery and indiscriminate
violence has become more widespread.180 The oldest monument to
Christopher Columbus in the United States dates back to the late
eighteenth century.181 But most American Columbus monuments
were built in the late nineteenth and throughout the twentieth cen-
turies with the financial and political support of Italian-American
[https://perma.cc/2F6F-T5E8] (discussing protests and counterprotests over Pueblo, Colorado’s
Columbus monument, which is also on the National Register of Historic Places). The objects,
sites, districts, and other properties designated in the National Register or as National
Historic Landmarks are available from the National Park Service’s National Register
Database, and spreadsheets current through October 2018 are on file with the author.
179. See, e.g., Steve Hendrix, The Columbus Day Holiday Is Under Attack, and So Are
Statues Honoring the Famed Explorer, WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2017/10/09/the-columbus-day-holiday-is-under-attack-
and-so-are-statues-honoring-the-famed-explorer/ [https://perma.cc/D6MA-V9EV].
180. See, e.g., Karim Doumar, Goodbye, Columbus Day: How Cities Turned Against a
Controversial Holiday, CITYLAB (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/life/2018/10/why-
cities-turned-against-columbus-day/572338/ [https://perma.cc/4ZKC-GXRG]; see also ANDRÉS
RESÉNDEZ, THE OTHER SLAVERY: THE UNCOVERED STORY OF INDIAN ENSLAVEMENT IN AMERICA
22-28 (2016) (quoting extensively from Columbus’s correspondence and describing his in-
volvement in and promotion of slavery and indiscriminate violence).
181. See Pamela Wood, Christopher Columbus Monument Vandalized in Baltimore, BALT.
SUN (Aug. 21, 2017, 4:05 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-
ci-columbus-monument-20170821-story.html [https://perma.cc/C98Z-T8Z2] (noting that the
Columbus monument currently located in Herring Run Park in Baltimore, Maryland was
originally erected at another site in 1792).
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organizations as a way to combat the ethnic and religious dis-
crimination their members faced.182
For example, the monument in New York’s Columbus Circle, built
in 1892 to commemorate the 400th anniversary of Columbus’s ar-
rival in the Americas, was conceived by the owner and editor of Il
Progresso, the first American daily newspaper in Italian, funded by
many small donations from recent immigrants, and then given to
the city to commemorate the “lasting friendship between Italy and
the United States.”183 In the late twentieth century, as awareness of
Columbus’s violence and enslavement of Native Americans became
more widespread, a reaction emerged against the many place names
and the federal holiday associated with him,184 and monuments to
Columbus became flashpoints for this larger conflict.185
The statue of Columbus that stands on a pedestal high above
Columbus Circle is only one of at least six Columbus monuments in
New York, though it is by far the most prominent Columbus mon-
ument in the city186 and probably the entire country. As a result, it
has always attracted special attention and controversy, even as
other monuments in New York have become part of the national
controversy over Columbus in recent years.187 Controversy around
182. See, e.g., Lakshmi Gandhi, How Columbus Sailed into U.S. History, Thanks to
Italians, NPR (Oct. 14, 2013, 10:15 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/ 2013/10/14/
232120128/how-columbus-sailed-into-u-s-history-thanks-to-italians [https://perma.cc/57M5-
KR83].
183. Conservancy Helps Preserve a Piece of Italian-American History, N.Y. LANDMARKS
CONSERVANCY, https://myemail.constantcontact.com/Landmark-News---Monthly-Update.ht
ml?soid=1129404286471&aid=xzchkey7Sw4 [https://perma.cc/YQ4U-SXTR].
184. See, e.g., Jourdan Bennett-Begaye, It’s a Good Day to Be Indigenous! A List of
Indigenous People’s Day Events, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Oct. 5, 2018), https://newsmaven.io/
indiancountrytoday/news/it-s-a-good-day-to-be-indigenous-a-list-of-indigenous-people-s-day-
events-6q820YDFykOi9igt00JURQ/ [https://perma.cc/5QNT-MW6B] (listing the sixty cities
and four states that have declared the second Monday of October to be Indigenous People’s
Day).
185. See, e.g., Cleve R. Wootston Jr., Why Police Have to Guard a Statue of Christopher
Columbus in New York Around the Clock, WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/10/07/why-police-have-to-guard-a-statue-of-
christopher-columbus-in-new-york-around-the-clock/ [https://perma.cc/FJ7H-DKCK].
186. Columbus on a Pedestal, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 1991), https://www.nytimes.com/1991/
10/14/opinion/columbus-on-a-pedestal.html [https://perma.cc/9TC8-F3LN].
187. See, e.g., Sarah Maslin Nir & Jeffery C. Mays, Christopher Columbus Statue in Central
Park Is Vandalized, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/12/ny
region/christopher-columbus-statue-central-park-vandalized.html [https://perma.cc/AP4Z-
QUVF].
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the Columbus Circle monument dates at least as far back as the
1930s, when Columbus Day celebrations around the monument
attracted some who vocally supported Mussolini’s fascist regime in
Italy.188 Indeed, some objected to the monument when it was erected
in 1892, arguing that Columbus was “cruel, and guilty of many
crimes.”189
Despite these initial objections, the Columbus Circle monument
generated little controversy for much of the twentieth century. But
by the late 1980s and 1990s, protests against the continued pres-
ence of the monument became commonplace, and in recent years
calls for its alteration and removal have steadily increased, though
support for the monument also remains strong.190 In 2017, in the
wake of violent protests across the country over built monuments,
New York’s mayor called for a commission to review the potential
alteration or removal of built monuments throughout the city,
including the statue at Columbus Circle.191 Although the commis-
sion ultimately decided in early 2018 that the Columbus Circle
monument should remain in place, supporters of the monument
believed that the city would target the monument for removal at a
future date.192
In response to these concerns, in October 2018 New York’s
Governor added the monument to the state register of historic
places and nominated the monument to the National Register of
Historic Places in a deliberate attempt to protect the monument
from removal in the future.193 And just a few months later, the
Columbus Circle monument was added to the National Register of
Historic Places,194 along with several other Columbus monuments
188. Jacey Fortin, Columbus Day Has Drawn Protests Almost from Day 1, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/09/us/columbus-day-protest.html [https://perma.cc/
KFG8-G7ZS].
189. Id.
190. See Hendrix, supra note 179.
191. William Neuman, Ordering Review of Statues Puts de Blasio in Tricky Spot, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/30/nyregion/ordering-review-of-
statues-puts-de-blasio-in-tricky-spot.html [https://perma.cc/4ZAP-DXNN].
192. Mara Gay, Christopher Columbus Statue Will Stay in Columbus Circle, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 12, 2018, 2:16 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/christopher-columbus-statue-will-stay-
in-columbus-circle-1515777407 [https://perma.cc/XAN9-YAB5].
193. Honan, supra note 18.
194. Kenneth Lovett, Columbus Monument Goes from Endangered to the National Register
of Historic Places, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 6, 2018, 5:05 PM), https://www.nydailynews.com/
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across the country from Pueblo, Colorado, to Providence, Rhode
Island, both of which have also attracted protests and calls for al-
teration or removal.195 To understand what sorts of protections
inclusion on the National Register and equivalent state registers
might bring protected monuments, it will be necessary to examine
the NHPA in more detail below.196
2. The Development of the NHPA and Its Protected Monuments
As the story of the Columbus Circle monument suggests, the most
frequently invoked federal statute that protects built monuments is
the National Historic Preservation Act.197 The NHPA will be dis-
cussed in detail below, but first a few predecessor statutes are also
important and must be considered, at least briefly, as well. The
NHPA is most accurately seen as the conclusion of a statutory and
regulatory process that began decades earlier, and many of these
earlier statutes remain relevant today.198 Of particular importance
are the Historic Sites Act of 1935,199 and the 1949 legislation that
created the National Trust for Historic Preservation.200 The Historic
news/politics/ny-pol-columbus-monument-national-register-of-historic-places-20181206-
story.html [https://perma.cc/KEC4-Y3L8].
195. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text (discussing these controversial
Columbus monuments).
196. Space does not permit a detailed examination of state laws written following the
NHPA’s model. Fortunately, most of these state laws use the NHPA as something more than
a template; they are essentially state law counterparts of the federal statute, designed to
reaffirm the role of State Historic Preservation Officers, and to commit state agencies to the
same procedural review as their federal counterparts under the NHPA. See, e.g., N.Y. PARKS
REC. & HIST. PRESERV. LAW § 14.09 (McKinney 2019). For a good review of New York’s law
and its relation to the NHPA, see J. Langdon Marsh & Judith Green Simon, The Protection
of Historic Resources in New York State: An Overview of Federal, State and Local Laws, 10
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 411, 417-27 (1982).
197. Act of Oct. 15, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-665, 80 Stat. 915 (originally codified at scattered
sections of 16 U.S.C., repealed and reenacted at scattered sections of 54 U.S.C.).
198. See, e.g., JOHN H. SPRINKLE, JR., CRAFTING PRESERVATION CRITERIA: THE NATIONAL
REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES AND AMERICAN HISTORIC PRESERVATION 6 (2014) (describing
the NHPA as “the logical conclusion” in a process “that began with the Historic Sites Act of
1935”).
199. ch. 593, 49 Stat. 666 (1935) (originally codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-467 (2012),
repealed and reenacted at 54 U.S.C. §§ 320101-320106 (2012)).
200. ch. 755, 63 Stat. 927 (1949) (originally codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-468, repealed and
reenacted at 54 U.S.C. §§ 312102-312106).
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Sites Act of 1935 gave rise to the National Historic Landmarks
(NHL) program and planted the seeds for the National Register.201
Both the NHL program and the National Trust are important in
their own right for monument protection and historic preservation
more generally. For example, the NHL program, which was orig-
inally developed by the National Park Service (NPS) pursuant to the
Historic Sites Act and later incorporated into the NHPA in the early
1980s,202 essentially makes up the “honor roll” of the National
Register.203 And the National Trust, once too small to take on the
NHL program, now supports substantial legal, technical, and finan-
cial assistance programs for preservation efforts in communities
around the country, and no longer depends on federal funding as a
result of its membership and fundraising efforts.204 Equally im-
portant, the Trust and what later became the NHL program helped
set the stage for passage in 1966 of the NHPA.205 Passage of the
Historic Sites Act, the creation of the Trust, and the beginning of
the NHL program helped demonstrate the importance of preserva-
tion. Indeed, one of Congress’s primary motivations behind the
NHPA was to enlarge the survey of vulnerable landmarks originally
contemplated by the Historic Sites Act, and to go beyond the
National Trust’s efforts in designating and helping to preserve vul-
nerable historic sites.206
Today, the NHPA is the bedrock of federal historic preservation
protection and the foundation of many related state and local
201. SPRINKLE, supra note 198, at 20.
202. National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-515, § 201,
94 Stat. 2987, 2988-2993 (codified as amended at 54 U.S.C. §§ 320301-320303); see also 36
C.F.R. § 65.4 (1995) (implementing the 1980 statutory requirements). For a good review of the
evolution of the NHL, the development of the National Trust and the NHPA, and the role of
the Park Service, see BARRY MACKINTOSH, THE HISTORIC SITES SURVEY AND NATIONAL HIS-
TORIC LANDMARKS PROGRAM: A HISTORY 4-6, 113-15 (1985); and SPRINKLE, supra note 198, at
17-19.
203. Jess R. Phelps, Preserving National Historic Landmarks?, 24 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 137,
163 (2016); see also Neighborhood Ass’n of the Back Bay, Inc. v. Fed. Transit Admin., 463 F.3d
50, 63-64 (1st Cir. 2006) (discussing the compliance requirements of the NHPA that are
invoked when National Historic Landmarks are at issue).
204. See, e.g., BRONIN & BYRNE, supra note 143, at 54-55.
205. Pub. L. No. 89-665, 80 Stat. 915 (1966) (originally codified at scattered sections of 16
U.S.C., repealed and reenacted at scattered sections of 54 U.S.C.).
206. See, e.g., BRONIN & BYRNE, supra note 143, at 57-58.
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historic preservation controls.207 Like the National Trust and the
Historic Sites Act, the NHPA’s focus has always been broader than
simple monument protection. The original language of the statute
addressed the need to preserve the “historical and cultural founda-
tions of the Nation” and provide “a sense of orientation to the
American people.”208 The current statutory language seeks to help
preserve “historic property,” whether or not it is owned by the
federal government, so that it “can exist in productive harmony”
with modern society while “fulfill[ing] the social, economic, and
other requirements of present and future generations.”209 Preserving
at least some specially designated historic monuments is a part of
that larger mission, but only a part; the NHPA is so central to
American historic preservation more generally that it arguably
embodies whatever national consensus exists about whether and
how we should preserve the past in public spaces.210
The core of the NHPA is the National Register, a list of properties
protected by the statute as “significant” to American history as well
as other areas of scientific or cultural activity.211 According to the
relevant implementing regulations, the “significance” required for
inclusion in the Register is primarily historical, arising out of
events, persons, methods of work or art that have been significant
“to the broad patterns of our history” or past.212 In other words,
significance is defined in terms that would be familiar to many early
proponents of built monuments in America.213 The plural definitions
and communal nature of significance under the NHPA allow states,
local governments, and even neighborhoods or cultural associations
207. Id. at 17; see also Antoinette J. Lee, Historic Preservationists and Cultural Resources
Managers: Preserving America’s Historic Places, in PUBLIC HISTORY: ESSAYS FROM THE FIELD
129, 130 (James B. Gardner & Peter S. LaPaglia eds., 1999) (noting that despite the efforts
of the NPS, preservation efforts did not really take off until the mid-1960s, with the passage
of the NHPA); supra note 143 and accompanying text.
208. Act of Oct. 15, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-665, 80 Stat. 915.
209. 54 U.S.C. § 300101 (2012).
210. See Rose, supra note 35, at 475-76 (noting that “[h]istoric preservation, [once] the
erstwhile preserve of patriotic organizations and academic architecture buffs,” now attracts
a wide range of institutional and individual interests).
211. 54 U.S.C. § 302101; see also 36 C.F.R. § 60.3 (1995) (providing definitions of many of
the statutory terms quoted above); id. § 60.4 (setting forth criteria for evaluation for the
National Register).
212. 36 C.F.R. § 60.4 (emphasis added).
213. See, e.g., supra notes 6-8, 112-13, 120-21 and accompanying text (gathering examples).
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to argue that a very diverse range of places are significant to their
identity, and therefore eligible for designation on the National
Register.214 Under the relevant regulations, the plural and localized
nature of this necessary “quality of significance” is further defined
as “integrity of location, design, setting, materials, workmanship,
feeling, and association”215—concepts that are rooted in a protected
property’s relationship to a particular place.216
The categories of significant property eligible for designation in
the National Register—namely, “sites, structures, and objects”217—
are not intended to be independent or exclusive, nor are their
boundaries entirely precise.218 Instead, as the examples in the reg-
ulatory definitions demonstrate, the boundaries of these categories
are fuzzy and overlapping.219 Taken collectively they encompass
virtually everything that one might want to preserve, including but
certainly not limited to the types of monuments analyzed in this
Article.220
Some confusion can arise from the relevant regulatory exclusions
of commemorative property, which upon a first reading would seem
to prohibit many monuments from designation. More specifically,
the regulations provide that property that is “primarily commemo-
rative in nature” should be excluded from the National Register,
including but not limited to “cemeteries, birthplaces, or graves of
historical figures.”221 Yet this exclusion also contains several ex-
ceptions, and these exceptions mean that lots of monuments, as the
term is used in this Article, can be and are included as objects (or
as other categories of eligible property) on the National Register
despite the exclusion of many “commemorative” properties.222 For
214. BRONIN & BYRNE, supra note 143, at 61.
215. 36 C.F.R. § 60.4.
216. See PATRICK W. ANDRUS, NATIONAL REGISTER BULLETIN: HOW TO APPLY THE NATIONAL
REGISTER CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION 44-45 (1997), https://www.nps.gov/subjects/national
register/upload/NRB-15_web508.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RGB-6KYL] (describing how to eval-
uate the integrity of a property under the regulations).
217. 54 U.S.C. § 300101 (2012).
218. See, e.g., Neighborhood Ass’n of the Back Bay, Inc. v. Fed. Transit Admin., 463 F.3d
50, 58 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting that “[p]recision of expression is not the hallmark of either” the
NHPA or the regulations that implement it).
219. See generally 36 C.F.R. § 60.3.
220. See, e.g., supra note 144 and accompanying text.
221. 36 C.F.R. § 60.4.
222. See id.
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example, commemorative property can be included if its “design,
age, tradition, or symbolic value has invested it with its own
exceptional significance,” or if it is associated with persons of “out-
standing” or “transcendent” importance.223
These exclusions cover most of the built monuments in America,
and as a result, lots of monuments, as the term is used in this
Article, can be and are included in the National Register.224 For the
purposes of monument protection, “objects” are the most relevant
category of protected property in the National Register. The
categories of “districts, sites, buildings, [and] structures”225 all may
have some relevance to monuments as defined in this Article,226 but
it is “objects” under the statute and regulations that is most rele-
vant for monument protection. The implementing regulations define
“objects” as “material thing[s]” of some “functional, aesthetic, cul-
tural, historical or scientific value,” which should be “related to a
specific setting or environment” even if they could be altered or re-
located.227 This term is elastic enough to include things such as
steamboats and historic mining equipment,228 which lack many of
the key features of monuments as the term is used here and
conventionally understood.
But the statutory term “objects” also clearly encompasses the
definition of monuments used in this Article, whether the objects
are representative statues of human figures or more abstract
memorials to groups of people, historic periods, or ideas. For
example, the implementing regulations single out the Adams
Memorial in Washington, D.C.’s Rock Creek Cemetery—a bronze
223. Id.; see also infra notes 228-29 and accompanying text (providing an example of a
gravesite designated as an object in the National Register).
224. See ANDRUS, supra note 216, at 5 (listing monuments as an example of the types of
objects that can be listed in the National Register); see also 36 C.F.R. § 60.3(j) (listing the
Adams Memorial in Washington, D.C. as a monument included in the National Register);
supra Part II.B.1 (identifying a number of monuments listed in the National Register).
225. 36 C.F.R. § 60.4.
226. For example, the controversial Columbus monument in Pittsburgh’s Schenley Park
is part of a historic district listed on the National Register. See Anya Sostek, Columbus Statue
in Schenley Park Defaced, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (Oct. 14, 2010, 12:00 AM), https://www. post-
gazette.com/local/city/2010/10/14/Columbus-statue-in-Schenley-Park-defaced/stories/2010
10140309 [https://perma.cc/8JHQ-2EJL].
227. 36 C.F.R. § 60.3(j).
228. See id. (using the Delta Queen Steamboat and the Sumpter Valley Gold Dredge as
examples of designated objects, along with the Adams Memorial discussed below).
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statue serving as a gravesite monument in a public park—as a good
example of an object worthy of designation on the National Register
and protection under the NHPA.229 Other examples of monuments
designated as objects on the National Register include the contro-
versial Columbus monuments discussed above in Colorado, Rhode
Island, Washington, D.C., and New York’s Columbus Circle, as well
as many others that are far less controversial.230 Part B.3 below
looks at how the NHPA protects monuments (and other types of
property) that are listed on the National Register.
3. Monument Protection and the NHPA Today
The process of designating property for the National Register
under the NHPA involves substantial input about each property
from potentially affected parties at the state and local level. This
means that the NHPA works very differently than the statue
statutes, which aim to protect large classes of monuments without
any consideration of their individual qualities or the specific com-
munities in which they are located.231 Responsibility for designation
and inclusion on the National Register has been delegated to the
National Park Service, and the Park Service official who ultimately
decides about eligibility for the National Register is called “Keeper
of the National Register of Historic Places” (Keeper).232 The NHPA
also provides for the creation of an Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation (ACHP),233 which plays a role in federal agency actions
that may affect properties included on or eligible for the National
Register.234
Participation by state and local officials is baked into the text of
the NHPA and the governing regulations, and community groups
and interested citizens have won relatively large roles in preserva-
tion under the NHPA through the application of the regulations and
229. Id.
230. See supra note 178; supra Part II.B.1.
231. See supra Part II.A.
232. 36 C.F.R. § 60.3(f), (h).
233. 54 U.S.C. § 304101 (Supp. V 2012) (establishing and describing the composition of the
ACHP).
234. See infra notes 250-51 and accompanying text.
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decades of practice.235 More specifically, the NHPA provides stan-
dards for the Secretary of the Interior to approve a State Historic
Preservation Program in each state, which is administered by a
State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO) responsible for nomi-
nating properties for possible inclusion on the Register.236 While
the SHPO bears formal responsibility for the decision to nominate
properties to the Keeper for designation, these decisions usually are
based on local government or private recommendations and the
state’s own evolving preservation priorities.237 Delisting follows a
similar process, as do reconsiderations of eligible property held by
private owners who object to its inclusion on the National Reg-
ister.238 Although the Keeper is the final decision maker and can
remove a listed property on her own motion, most delistings pass
through the relevant SHPO first.239
Although the statute describes the roles of SHPOs and the Keeper
in detail, in practice it is local governments, community groups, and
interested citizens who frequently start the nomination process,
focusing on potential threats to monuments and other types of prop-
erty eligible for the National Register.240 And it is also individual
citizens and community groups who frequently keep the nomination
process moving even after a particular property’s eligibility is taken
up by an SHPO or submitted to the Keeper.241 This diffuse, localized
interest is indispensable for the entire process of inclusion on the
National Register.242 In addition to the role that state and local
governments and individual members of the relevant communities
235. See, e.g., JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER ET AL., LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOP-
MENT REGULATION LAW 553 (4th ed. 2018) (“Most properties find their way onto the Register
through state or tribal nomination spurred by local initiative.”).
236. 54 U.S.C. §§ 302301, 302303; 36 C.F.R. § 60.3(m), (n). SHPOs are appointed by the
state’s governor and must employ a staff qualified in archaeology and historic preservation.
36 C.F.R. § 61.4.
237. See JUERGENSMEYER ET AL., supra note 235, at 554 (“In reality, the local public or local
tribe numbers actually survey the properties and draft nominations for the SHPO or THPO
to review.”). Tribal Historic Preservation Officers (THPOs) play similar roles to SHPOs where
relevant. Id.
238. See 36 C.F.R. §§ 60.14-.15; see also BRONIN & BYRNE, supra note 143, at 71-73 (citing
and discussing same).
239. See BRONIN & BYRNE, supra note 143, at 73.
240. Rose, supra note 35, at 531-32.
241. Id.
242. See id. at 532 (“[T]he entire review process depends on the alertness of local groups.”).
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play during the nomination and review process, any person or local
government who is disappointed in the SHPO’s decision may appeal
it to the Keeper.243 This means that community groups and individ-
ual interested citizens are often active in National Register
decisions even after the SHPO has made a determination about
whether to nominate a property to the Keeper’s consideration.
Beyond the nomination process, the diffused and localized
interest that is so important to eligibility decisions for the National
Register plays a significant role in how the NHPA actually protects
monuments and other property. This is particularly easy to see
through some of the NHPA’s funding mechanisms. For example, the
NHPA provides for the establishment of a National Historic Pres-
ervation Fund,244 which draws on monies collected from offshore
drilling leases and other federal oil and gas royalties to carry out
the purposes of the NHPA through matching grants to states.245
These funding provisions have been one of the most important
drivers of preservation activity at the state and local level.246
In addition to these funding provisions, the core provisions of the
NHPA also involve substantial participation by state and local
actors as well. These core provisions are provided in what has
traditionally been known as section 106 of the NHPA,247 which
focuses on federal agency actions that the statute broadly refers to
as “undertaking[s].”248 More specifically, section 106 requires federal
agencies to consider the potential impacts and adverse effects of any
undertaking on any property that is either included or eligible for
inclusion on the National Register.249 Section 106 also requires
federal agencies to allow the ACHP a reasonable opportunity to
comment on an undertaking that might affect such property.250 In
243. 54 U.S.C. § 302104(d) (Supp. V 2012); 36 C.F.R. § 60.12.
244. 54 U.S.C. § 303101.
245. Id. (citing Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1338 (2012) and 10 U.S.C.
§ 7433(b) (2012)).
246. See JUERGENSMEYER ET AL., supra note 235, at 554.
247. 54 U.S.C. § 306108.
248. Id.; see also 54 U.S.C. § 300320 (defining undertakings as any “project, activity, or
program” that is funded in whole or in part under a federal agency’s jurisdiction).
249. 54 U.S.C. § 306108; see also id. § 300308 (defining historic property, as used in section
106, as any property included or eligible for inclusion on the National Register).
250. Id. § 306108; see also id. § 304101 (defining the composition of the federal Advisory
Council on Historic Preservation discussed in section 106).
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addition to consulting with the ACHP, the implementing regula-
tions require federal agencies to consult about the potential impact
of their undertakings with SHPOs, Tribal Historic Preservation
Officers (THPOs) where relevant, representatives of local govern-
ments with jurisdiction over the area in which the effects of an
undertaking may occur, and applicants for federal permits, licenses,
assistance, or other approvals relevant to the undertaking.251
Although consultation with the public at large is not required to
the same degree as with SHPOs and local government representa-
tives, the implementing regulations note that public opinion is
“essential” to the section 106 process.252 Accordingly, the implement-
ing regulations provide that the acting federal agency should
consider the public’s views in a way that reflects the “complexity” of
both the undertaking and its effects on the protected property at
issue.253 The acting federal agency does not have to obtain the
endorsement of all interested members of the public—indeed, this
would often be impossible—but the consultation provisions in the
statute and regulations give members of the public an opportunity
to influence section 106 decisions by influencing the position of the
SHPO (or, where relevant, the THPO).254
The protections afforded by section 106 are, therefore, essentially
procedural. Section 106 requires that agencies “stop, look, and
listen” before they act in a way that might affect a property on or
eligible for the National Register, but it does not compel a particular
outcome.255 This means that section 106 is frequently compared to
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).256 The core pro-
visions of both NEPA and section 106 impose procedural require-
ments of analysis and documentation on federal agencies prior to
actions that might affect statutorily protected resources.257
251. 36 C.F.R. § 800.2(c) (2018).
252. Id. § 800.2(d).
253. Id.
254. BRONIN & BYRNE, supra note 143, at 147.
255. See, e.g., Bus. & Residents All. of E. Harlem v. Jackson, 430 F.3d 584, 590-91 (2d Cir.
2005) (citing Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 848 F.2d 1246, 1260-61
(D.C. Cir. 1988)).
256. See, e.g., Nat’l Tr. for Historic Pres. v. Blanck, 938 F. Supp. 908, 919 (D.D.C. 1996)
(noting that “many courts fruitfully compare” NEPA and section 106). See generally National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h (2012).
257. See 36 C.F.R. § 800.8 (encouraging federal agencies to coordinate their efforts to
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The parallels between NEPA and section 106 grow deeper upon
closer inspection. For example, NEPA’s procedural and disclosure
requirements allow the public to exert pressure on the acting federal
agency,258 just as the procedural and consultation provisions of
section 106 allow the public to pressure the SHPO or the acting
agency.259 Moreover, in practice, the enforcement of NEPA’s re-
quirements has come through legal actions filed pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by individual citizens and in-
terest groups.260 Similarly, interest groups or individual members
of the public may attempt to influence section 106 decisions through
litigation, by arguing, for example, that deficient consultation and
an inadequate record rendered the acting agency’s decision about its
undertaking “arbitrary and capricious” under the APA.261 Indeed,
like the practical enforcement of NEPA’s requirements, pressure
and litigation from individual citizens and civic groups is essential
to enforce section 106’s requirements.262 The procedural focus and
concern for local interests embedded in the NHPA are just two of
the many differences between it and the statue statutes. These and
other differences are examined at length in Part II.C immediately
below.
C. A Critical Comparison of the NHPA and the Statue Statutes
The statue statutes should be repealed for a number of reasons.
For starters, they are constitutionally suspect, thanks to the monu-
mental messages of exclusion and discrimination that they echo and
emit. They also poison public discourse about Confederate monu-
ments, making it harder for local communities to reckon with both
the longstanding negative impacts and recent crises around these
memorials. But despite the basic repugnance of the statue statutes,
comply with both section 106 and NEPA); JUERGENSMEYER ET AL., supra note 235, at 554-55
(discussing the guidance documents used by federal agencies to coordinate NEPA and section
106’s requirements).
258. See JAMES RASBAND ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 291 (2d ed. 2009).
259. See BRONIN & BYRNE, supra note 143, at 147.
260. See, e.g., RASBAND ET AL., supra note 258, at 260.
261. BRONIN & BYRNE, supra note 143, at 147.
262. See Rose, supra note 35, at 531-32 (noting that “[p]rivate litigation is especially
important” under section 106 and suggesting that the linchpin of the NHPA essentially
depends on litigation by civic and neighborhood organizations).
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their many pathologies have much to teach us about how American
monument-protection laws have worked and how they ought to
work.
As shown above, the evolution of American attitudes toward
monuments has been marked by communitarian impulses. For ex-
ample, Justice Durfee dreamed of replacing America’s monumental
skepticism with a new network of monuments that would bind
together the country’s collective consciousness and preserve a
particular conception of democracy and freedom for the future.263
Justice Holmes and others cherished monumental trees not merely
for the pleasant memories they evoked but because these natural
monuments provided a locus for significant events in the local
community’s life along with the transmission of the community’s
values.264 Moreover, as attitudes toward monuments thawed in the
nineteenth century, Washington, D.C. was filled with memorials
and rural monumental cemeteries spread across the country, all
designed to bind together the immediate community and perpetuate
republican ideals across generations.265
It is important not to overstate the case: for example, the rural-
urban divide that currently bedevils America’s national conscious-
ness is at least as old as the country, and it has always haunted how
Americans have thought and fought about monuments in ways that
have little to do with fostering communities of interest or memory.266
And many American monuments have been intertwined with a
darker narrative of exclusion, discrimination, and racist violence.267
But at least until recently, America’s seesaw evolution into a
monument-friendly country has been substantially motivated by a
desire to bind communities large and small closer together, even at
the risk of enshrining monuments that are anodyne or baloney.268
In general, American historic preservation law is also motivated
by a fundamentally communitarian spirit. For example, local
263. See DURFEE, supra note 6, at 345.
264. See Holmes, supra note 9, at 9.
265. See supra notes 108-18 and accompanying text.
266. See, e.g., SAVAGE, supra note 69, at 41-43 (describing the heightened resistance to
monuments to George Washington by Republican legislators).
267. See supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
268. See, e.g., supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text (discussing Lincoln’s birthplace and
other spurious monuments).
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historic district designations that include architectural controls take
on a substantive communitarian focus insofar as they recognize and
attempt to shape the relationship between the physical character of
a place and its political aspect.269 And they are procedurally
communitarian insofar as they provide multiple points of focus for
neighborhoods and local interest groups to organize, educate their
members, and gain leverage within the larger community.270
The NHPA embodies both strands of this communitarian focus in
American historic preservation law. Its communitarian focus has
been baked in from the outset: its original version sought to provide
a sense of “orientation” to the American people by preserving the
country’s “historical and cultural foundations,”271 and the current
version seeks to integrate monuments and other protected property
in “productive harmony” with the needs of modern society.272 The
statute’s implementation is marked by the same focus. At almost
every turn, the statute and its implementing regulations make
SHPOs and THPOs, local governments, community groups, and
individual interested citizens key actors in the nomination and
consultation processes.273 Section 106 is designed for community
groups, interested citizens, and local governments to play essential
roles—providing multiple points of focus for education, organization,
lobbying, and even litigation that are absolutely essential for the
system to function.274
In contrast, the statue statutes attempt to preserve all types of
monuments, regardless of their effects on communities of geogra-
phy, memory, or interest. Indeed, the facial language of these
statutes simply seeks to preserve certain types of monuments with-
out any interest at all in the effects of this preservation. And the
procedural aspects of the statue statutes are even more antithetical
to the communitarian turn in American attitudes toward monu-
ments and monument-protection laws. Many of the statue statutes
entirely eschew any role for community self-determination or the
participation of affected citizens in determining what monuments
269. Rose, supra note 35, at 522-24, 533-34.
270. Id.
271. Act of Oct. 15, 1996, Pub. L. No. 89-665, 80 Stat. 915.
272. 54 U.S.C. § 300101 (2012).
273. See supra notes 235-46 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 253-62 and accompanying text.
2020] WE ARE ALL GROWING OLD TOGETHER 1311
should be protected—they simply protect all monuments of a certain
type and age, full stop.275
Another fundamental difference between the NHPA and the
statue statutes concerns the nature of the protections they are
designed to provide. As discussed above, the core protections of the
NHPA are essentially procedural: they force the relevant federal
agencies to consider the effects of actions they take on properties of
historical significance listed on the National Register, much like
NEPA in the environmental context.276 But section 106 does not
mandate a particular outcome in the same way as the statue stat-
utes, most of which seek to protect Confederate monuments un-
altered in their present sites indefinitely.277 Moreover, the NHPA’s
essential procedural protections can be reversed by essentially the
same steps that are required to include properties on the National
Register.278
In contrast, it is much harder to modify the substantive pro-
tections that the statue statutes seek to provide. In fact, the facial
language of some of the statutes precludes any such modification.279
As other work has identified, there are opportunities under many
statue statutes for local governments and others to challenge the
statute’s protections, but these opportunities are best understood as
mistakes made by the statue statutes’ drafters,280 rather than the
deliberate opportunities for revision incorporated into the NHPA.
Beyond these unintended “flaws,” the absolute protections that
many of the statue statutes seek to provide are intended to be essen-
tially permanent. Even when a statue statute does include some
formal provision for amending or withdrawing protections in cer-
tain cases, these provisions are generally designed to be as difficult
as possible, and, in any case, removing the protections is far more
difficult than the instantaneous protection granted by most statue
statutes.281
275. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 256-57 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
279. See e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 41-9-232(b)-(c), 41-9-235(a)(1) (2019) (providing a waiver pro-
cess, but only for monuments that have been in place for twenty to forty years).
280. Bray, supra note 23, at 19-22, 47.
281. For example, South Carolina’s statute provides that a monument’s protections can
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A final difference between the NHPA and the statue statutes
concerns the length of time and deliberation involved under each for
protecting monuments. It can take a long time for a property to be
included on the National Register after its initial nomination, given
the number of state and federal officials and local participants who
may be involved. As a rough guide, the Park Service suggests that
SHPOs review of proposed nominations will take at least ninety
days, and that the Park Service and Keeper’s decision about the
nomination will take another forty-five days.282
In contrast, many of the statue statutes were passed extremely
hastily, even as they provide sweeping consequences for a huge
number of monuments within a particular state. For example, the
bill that became Tennessee’s statue statute was introduced in late
January 2013283—drafted, as noted above, by members of the
Tennessee SCV in the Tennessee legislature.284 The specific impetus
for the bill seems to have been the city of Memphis’s removal of a
sign installed by the Tennessee SCV near a monument to Nathan
Bedford Forrest in December 2012.285 After the bill was introduced,
Memphis hurriedly renamed several parks, which in turn led to
demonstrations by the Klan and counterprotests by local resi-
dents,286 all before the bill was enacted on April 1, 2013.287 In short,
only sixty-one days elapsed between the introduction of the bill and
its passage. Indeed, no more than 107 days elapsed between
Memphis’s removal of the SCV’s sign and the passage of a bill pur-
porting to protect all Confederate monuments in Tennessee—less
than the usual minimum time required for listing a single monu-
ment on the National Register.
only be waived by a two-thirds vote of the state legislature. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1-165(B)
(2019).
282. How to List a Property, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/subjects/national
register/how-to-list-a-property.htm [https://perma.cc/4C9R-QAVA].
283. See, e.g., Tennessee Heritage Protection Act of 2013, 2013 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 75, H.B.
553 (introduced on Jan. 31, 2013).
284. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
285. Jackson Baker, Sign of the Times?, MEM. FLYER (Jan. 10, 2013), https://www.memphis
flyer.com/memphis/sign-of-the-times/Content?oid=3326642 [https://perma.cc/HP5P-Q83F].
286. Kevin M. Levin, The Ku Klux Klan Protests as Memphis Renames a City Park,
ATLANTIC (Feb. 27, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/02/the-ku-klux-
klan-protests-as-memphis-renames-a-city-park/273560/ [https://perma.cc/97JX-JQRL].
287. 2013 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 75 (enacted on April 1, 2013).
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The haste with which the statue statutes were passed is partic-
ularly problematic given their anticommunitarian character, as
well as the permanent protections that their facial language pur-
ports to provide. All of these characteristics tend to undermine the
legitimacy of the statue statutes, especially with local communities
who object to monuments that they appear to be saddled with
indefinitely. Of course, the NHPA can also be used in haste to
protect monuments that are historically objectionable and locally
distasteful.288 But these are exceptions to the general thrust of the
NHPA. There are many safeguards, procedural and substantive,
built into the statute and implementing regulations that make it
hard to protect historically objectionable monuments that are or be-
come unwanted by their neighbors. In contrast, the statue statutes
are designed to preserve monuments condemned by history which
local communities might wish to remove.
Comparing the statue statutes and the NHPA reveals many
truths about both. It helps to highlight some problematic uses of the
NHPA, but it also shows how much of an outlier the statue statutes
are, for reasons that go beyond their objectionable history. Part III
below takes a close look at the Antiquities Act and the monuments
that it protects before comparing it to the statue statutes and the
NHPA.
III. UNSURPASSED IN WONDERS FROM EARTH TO SKY: AMERICAN
NATIONAL MONUMENTS AND THE ANTIQUITIES ACT
The usual process for creating national monuments is much more
abrupt than the process for adding monuments or other protected
property to the National Register, and the statute that provides the
framework for national monuments is far briefer than the NHPA
and many of the statue statutes. National monuments are pro-
claimed by the President pursuant to the Antiquities Act of 1906,
which was passed in the middle of the first great era of American
enthusiasm for both natural and built monuments.289 Since its
passage, over 150 national monuments have been dedicated by
288. See supra Part II.B.
289. Pub. L. No. 59-209, 34 Stat. 225 (1906) (codified as amended at 54 U.S.C. § 320301
(2012)).
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presidential proclamation.290 Many of these monuments are just a
few acres in size or even smaller, but several are hundreds of thou-
sands of acres in size or larger, and many, though certainly not all,
of the largest national monuments are among the most recently
created.291
A fierce debate about presidential authority to reduce previously
designated national monuments has been the most pressing
controversy related to the Antiquities Act in recent months. As
noted in the Introduction, in December 2017, President Trump
attempted to reduce both the Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-
Escalante national monuments by a total of almost two million
acres, which led to a number of legal challenges that are currently
working their way through the courts.292 President Clinton pro-
claimed the Grand Staircase monument in 1996,293 and almost
immediately sparked intense controversy.294 Over twenty years after
its creation, the monument enjoys substantial support throughout
the state and the nation,295 but it remains deeply resented by many
of its immediate neighbors.296 The Bears Ears monument was cre-
ated much more recently, at the end of President Obama’s term,297
but it sparked intense support and opposition that coalesced in
290. See Antiquities Act 1906-2006: Maps, Facts, & Figures, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://
www.nps.gov/archeology/sites/antiquities/MonumentsList.htm [https://perma.cc/N37U-6AP6].
291. See id. (providing a list of all national monuments with their original sizes, dates and
sizes of any expansions, and dates of redesignation as a national park or transfer to state
ownership where relevant).
292. See, e.g., Josh Dawsey & Juliet Eilperin, Trump Shrinks Two Huge National
Monuments in Utah, Drawing Praise and Protests, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-scales-back-two-huge-national-monuments-in-utah-
drawing-praise-and-protests/2017/12/04/758c85c6-d908-11e7-b1a8-62589434a581_story.html
[https://perma.cc/8DM5-DUV3]; see also supra notes 5, 64-65 and accompanying text
(discussing the reaction to President Trump’s attempt to reduce these monuments).
293. Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50223 (Sept. 24, 1996).
294. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
295. See, e.g., Dawsey & Eilperin, supra note 292 ; see also supra note 5 (describing protests
against Trump’s monument reduction).
296. See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin, A Diminished Monument, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/national/environment/will-anyone-mine-after-
grand-staircase-escalante-reduction-by-trump/ [https://perma.cc/6P2T-K5WJ] (gathering local
sources).
297. See Proclamation No. 9558, 82 Fed. Reg. 1139 (Jan. 5, 2017) (noting that “[f]rom earth
to sky,” the protected monument “is unsurpassed in wonders”).
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coalitions very similar to those that arose around the Grand
Staircase monument.298
These monuments, and the controversy surrounding President
Trump’s attempt to reduce their size, have attracted a great deal of
controversy, making them good vehicles to begin an examination of
the Antiquities Act. Part III.A below studies the Antiquities Act
and the narrow but important issue around the President’s con-
tested authority to reduce or abolish a previously designated mon-
ument. Part III.B provides a comparison of the Antiquities Act with
the NHPA and the statue statutes and proposes a reform of the
Antiquities Act.
A. The Evolution of National Monuments and the Antiquities Act
The Antiquities Act was passed after several years of debate,
informed by a growing concern that vulnerable prehistoric struc-
tures were being looted or destroyed,299 a desire to protect important
scenic and scientific resources on the public lands,300 and a belief
that sometimes threats to these resources might be so pressing that
requiring specific legislation to protect them would be too time-
consuming and uncertain.301 This idea—that national monument
proclamations could be emergency measures to preserve irreplace-
able and monumental natural, scenic, or archaeological resources—
has been borne out by subsequent history. Many of America’s best-
loved national parks were originally protected as national monu-
ments, including Acadia, Bryce Canyon, Death Valley, Glacier Bay,
the Grand Canyon, Grand Teton, Olympic, and Zion.302 Congress has
changed some national monuments in a different way. Rather than
being converted into national parks through specific legislation,
they have been transferred by Congress out of federal hands and
298. See, e.g., Dawsey & Eilperin, supra note 292.
299. See Britton-Purdy, supra note 64, at 946-48.
300. See LEE, supra note 68, at 45-57.
301. See Lisa Raffensperger, The Highs and Lows of the Antiquities Act, NPR (May 23,
2008, 12:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=90631198 [https://
perma.cc/ELK3-HBGT].
302. See, e.g., Robert W. Righter, National Monuments to National Parks: The Use of the
Antiquities Act of 1906, 20 W. HIST. Q. 281, 281 (1989).
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into state ownership.303 Castle Pinckney, discussed in the Introduc-
tion, is one such former national monument.304 But many more
national monuments have never been converted into national parks
or transferred to the states. They continue to be managed by the
National Park Service or other federal agencies pursuant to their
specific presidential proclamations and the general authority grant-
ed by the Antiquities Act.
The statute responsible for protecting so much federal land was
and remains remarkably brief; the core substantive provisions of the
Antiquities Act comprise just two sentences.305 First, the Antiquities
Act gives the President discretionary authority to “declare by public
proclamation historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric struc-
tures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest that are” on
federal land “to be national monuments.”306 And second, the Act pro-
vides that the limits of any parcels of land reserved as part of these
national monuments “shall be confined to the smallest area com-
patible with the proper care and management of the objects to be
protected.”307 Despite its brevity, the Antiquities Act and national
monuments have always been controversial—in fact they are best
understood through their controversies.
President Trump’s attempt to reduce the size of Grand Staircase
and Bears Ears is best understood as the latest episode in an on-
going drama. It has proven to be highly controversial, including for
reasons that have little to do with the Antiquities Act specifically.
It is, for example, the largest reduction of protection for public lands
in American history.308 But it has also focused attention on the fol-
lowing question: Does the Antiquities Act impliedly authorize a
President to reduce or abolish national monuments in the same way
that it expressly authorizes a President to create them?309
303. NAT’L PARK SERV., supra note 290.
304. Id.; see supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text. Congress, of course, retains the
ability to ratify, create, alter, transfer, or abolish monuments. For a list of such congressional
actions and related monuments, see NAT’L PARK SERV., supra note 290.
305. See Squillace, supra note 45, at 476-77 (“Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the
Antiquities Act ... is its brevity.”).
306. 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a) (2012).
307. Id. § 320301(b).
308. Dawsey & Eilperin, supra note 292.
309. See, e.g., Richard H. Seamon, Dismantling Monuments, 70 FLA. L. REV. 553, 555
(2018).
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Defenders of President Trump’s attempt to reduce the size of
these monuments point out that previous presidents have acted to
reduce the boundaries of national monuments many times since the
Antiquities Act was passed (although prior to 2017 the last such
modification occurred in 1963) and none of these previous efforts
were challenged in court.310 They also argue that an implied
presidential power to reduce or revoke previous monument procla-
mations is inherent given the nature of the modern administrative
state.311 Given that most other executive orders and administrative
actions taken by a president are not one-way ratchets, but rather
can be modified or reversed by future presidents, presidential
proclamations under the Antiquities Act so too can be altered by
future presidential actions—or so the argument in support of
President Trump’s reduction goes.312
On the other hand, the many critics of Trump’s attempt to reduce
Bears Ears and Grand Staircase point out that since the last pres-
idential reduction of a national monument in 1963, Congress passed
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA).313
These critics point out that aside from the Antiquities Act, FLPMA
removed most of the President’s unilateral authority to withdraw
lands from development or resource extraction,314 and FLPMA also
appears to suggest that only Congress may modify or revoke with-
drawals made under the Antiquities Act by a previous president.315
In addition, critics of the proposed monument reductions point to
the Constitution’s Property Clause, which gives Congress plenary
power over public lands.316 Given this plenary power, any delegation
of congressional power over public lands should be construed nar-
rowly, and since the text of the Antiquities Act only grants the
power to reserve national monuments, these critics argue that it is
310. Id. at 575.
311. Yoo & Gaziano, supra note 64, at 640-41.
312. Id.
313. Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (1976) (codified primarily at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782
(2012)).
314. See, e.g., Squillace et al., supra note 64, at 59-60 (citing FLPMA § 704(a), 90 Stat.
2792).
315. See, e.g., id. at 60-64 (discussing in detail FLPMA § 204, 43 U.S.C. § 1714, its
legislative history, and the anomalous drafting error that has complicated previous analyses
of same).
316. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
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a mistake to read any implied presidential authority to modify or
revoke into the Antiquities Act.317 Finally, critics of President
Trump’s attempt to reduce these monuments also argue that giving
any future president authority to reduce or abolish a previous pres-
ident’s monument designation would be inconsistent with the
fundamental goals of the Antiquities Act, which was ultimately
intended as a check against the “opportunistic” expropriation of
unique resources from vulnerable and irreplaceable public sites.318
This important issue has been thoroughly ventilated in the ex-
isting literature, and the present court challenges may provide at
least a temporary resolution of the issue in the near future—
although readers can judge for themselves how the current or future
Supreme Court is likely to resolve these pending challenges. But as
long as the Antiquities Act remains in something like its current
state, controversies like this present fight will remain because they
are essentially supervenient on an underlying debate about the
democratic legitimacy of national monuments proclaimed under the
Antiquities Act.
As noted above, it has always been extraordinarily difficult to
justify the Antiquities Act and a president’s authority to designate
monuments to people disappointed by those monuments.319 Indeed,
this sentiment is never far from the surface even when a president
attempts to reduce existing monuments. For example, immediately
after the attempted reduction of Bears Ears and Grand Staircase,
the Speaker of Utah’s State House of Representatives cheered the
action, claiming that the president had finally “listened” to Utahns
and proved that they were not merely living in “a flyover state”320—
feelings similar to those that the statue statutes evoke in local
communities. Part III.B provides an analysis of this larger debate
and a comparison of the Antiquities Act with the statue statutes
and the NHPA.
317. Mark Squillace, The Looming Battle over the Antiquities Act, HARV. L. REV. BLOG
(Jan. 6, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/the-looming-battle-over-the-antiquities-act/
[https://perma.cc/79DK-6RVF].
318. Britton-Purdy, supra note 64, at 948-49, 954-55; see also Squillace et al., supra note
64, at 70-71 (arguing that granting presidents the authority to reduce or abolish previously
designated monuments threatens the Antiquities Act’s “remarkable success”).
319. See supra notes 48-50, 57-59, 293-98 and accompanying text.
320. Dawsey & Eilperin, supra note 292 (quoting Utah House Speaker Gregory Hughes).
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B. A Critical Comparison of the Antiquities Act, the NHPA,
and the Statue Statutes
The Antiquities Act is not laden with the troubling history of the
statue statutes, and the monuments it seeks to protect are incompa-
rably more valuable than the monuments shielded by the statue
statutes. But comparing the Antiquities Act to the statue statutes
and the NHPA can help put the recurring controversies of the
Antiquities Act in context and, perhaps, suggest some avenues for
reform.
The perceived haste associated with many monument designa-
tions leads many monument opponents to believe that they are
motivated by political opportunism, especially when they are hastily
proclaimed near the end of an administration.321 This, in turn,
causes many state and local opponents of new national monuments
to argue that the monuments are unjustified or even democratically
illegitimate,322 much like local opponents of the statue statutes, who
understand that these statutes were passed in haste and for bad
reasons that were not ventilated in either the text of the statutes or
their related legislative debates.323 There is an important fundamen-
tal difference: the statue statutes really were passed in haste and
without good reasons, whereas many national monuments, espe-
cially recent monuments, are the product of years of careful work.324
But for local opponents of specific national monuments, “midnight”
monument proclamations late in a presidential term can appear to
321. See, e.g., Rasband, supra note 74, at 138 (describing the reaction to President
Johnson’s final monument proclamations, which took place ninety minutes before he left
office).
322. See, e.g., Mark Matthews & Greg Hanscom, Babbitt’s Monument Tour Blazes On, HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS (June 19, 2000), https://www.hcn.org/issues/181/5873 [https://perma.cc/8Q6U-
NKJE] (quoting Senator Slade Gorton, among others, who argued that President Clinton’s
monument proclamations were hasty and unjustified).
323. See supra notes 42-43, 171 and accompanying text.
324. See, e.g., Squillace, supra note 45, at 474-75, 502-14 (describing Presidents Jimmy
Carter and Bill Clinton’s establishment of large national monuments under the Antiquities
Act); see also Patrick Reis, Interior Releases More of Leaked List of Potential National
Monuments, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2010), https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/
gwire/2010/08/11/11greenwire-interior-releases-more-of-leaked-list-of-poten-87178.html
[https://perma.cc/FH4F-VB3Q] (detailing complaints about multiple potential national
monuments).
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be politically opportunistic, regardless of the work and expertise
involved prior to the monument’s proclamation.325
Opponents of relatively large national monuments also argue that
they are illegitimate because they cannot be justified by the limited
scope of the Antiquities Act. It is a mistake, they argue, to construe
the brief and arguably ambiguous language of the Antiquities Act
so broadly as to support national monuments hundreds of thousands
of acres in size or larger. They also argue that the Antiquities Act as
it has been applied is dangerously anticommunitarian—and here,
too, they argue that it is a mistake to construe the Antiquities Act
in such a way as to amplify its anticommunitarian tendencies. Each
of these arguments will be briefly reviewed in turn.
It is hard to argue that Congress in 1906 clearly intended the
expansive interpretation of the Antiquities Act that we live with
today, even for those who, like the author of this Article, believe
that most if not all of the monuments so designated have been an
invaluable boon for the nation.326 For example, beyond the statute’s
narrow language, the creation of Mesa Verde National Park pro-
vides additional evidence of a relatively limited scope for the An-
tiquities Act. The park was created by specific legislation in 1906,
the year the Antiquities Act was passed and the first national mon-
ument was proclaimed.327 Yet soon after the Antiquities Act was
passed, President Theodore Roosevelt designated monuments sub-
stantially larger than Mesa Verde National Park,328 including the
325. See, e.g., Larry D. Curtis, Bears Ears National Monument Designated by President
Obama in Utah, KUTV (Dec. 28, 2016), https://kutv.com/news/local/bears-ears-national-
monument-designated-by-president-obama [https://perma.cc/N64Z-8GK3].
326. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 65, at 1336 (defending modern interpretations of the
Antiquities Act based on years of congressional acquiescence but conceding the “apparently
limited intentions of the 1906 Congress”). Klein also points out that previous drafts of the
legislation that originally became the Antiquities Act expressly limited the size of mon-
uments, but that such express limitations were removed from the final version of the statute.
Id. at 1341-42. This deletion, along with the insertion of the statutory language referring to
objects of historic or scientific interest—relied upon by President Theodore Roosevelt in his
proclamation of the Grand Canyon National Monument—suggest that the Antiquities Act
may not necessarily be quite as limited as some readers of its legislative history have
suggested. Id.
327. LEE, supra note 68, at 80-82.
328. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 809, 35 Stat. 2247 (1909) (Mount Olympus National
Monument); Proclamation No. 697, 34 Stat. 3266 (1906) (Petrified Forest National
Monument).
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Grand Canyon National Monument, which is more than 800,000
acres.329 Still larger monuments were to come. For example, in 1925
President Coolidge proclaimed the Glacier Bay National Monument,
at over 1.3 million acres.330
In its 1920 decision in Cameron v. United States, the Supreme
Court upheld such expansive monument proclamations. The Court
concluded that the Grand Canyon itself directly fit the statute’s
language of “unusual scientific interest,” in part because of its
monumental nature as “one of the great natural wonders” that
“annually draws to its borders thousands of visitors.”331 And much
more recently, courts have held that “lyrical” descriptions of
“magnificent groves of towering giant sequoias” and “an enormous
number of habitats” are sufficiently specific to satisfy the statutory
limits of the “smallest area” sufficient to protect the proclaimed
monument, even for a monument of over 325,000 acres.332 In short,
arguments that the Antiquities Act’s sweeping application is
inconsistent with its statutory text and stated purpose have
consistently lost, almost from the instant that the Act was passed.
They have been met, in effect, with a vast national shrug, based on
Congress’s acquiescence in the face of the Act’s broad application,333
and a sense that the treasures protected by the Act are worth the
disquiet caused by its broad application. Although (to date) they
have consistently lost in court and in Congress, arguments about
the Act’s illegitimacy have never gone away,334 because presidential
proclamations of enormous and permanent national monuments
without any subsequent specific legislative validation continue to
feel illegitimate to many who live nearby.335
329. See Proclamation No. 794, 35 Stat. 2175 (1908).
330. See Proclamation No. 1733, 43 Stat. 1988 (1925).
331. Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 455-56 (1920).
332. Tulare County v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1138, 1140-41 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (internal quotations
omitted).
333. Klein, supra note 65, at 1336-37, 1342, 1355-60.
334. See, e.g., Erin Hawley, Trump Gets It Right on Antiquities Act Rollback, THE HILL
(Dec. 9, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/364011-trump-gets-it-right-
on-antiquities-act-rollback [https://perma.cc/7EX3-MW4Y] (arguing that the Antiquities Act
has been interpreted in abusive and illegitimate ways, decimating already-struggling rural
communities).
335. See supra notes 48-50, 58-59, 294-98, 319-20 and accompanying text.
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Like the statue statutes, and unlike the NHPA, the Antiquities
Act as drafted and as it has often been applied is anticommuni-
tarian, often profoundly so, and its anticommunitarian nature is
often highlighted in arguments about the Act’s supposed fun-
damental illegitimacy.336 Unlike the substantial role that local
communities, interest groups, and state officials always play in
decisions about inclusion on the National Register, local opponents
of national monuments frequently feel ignored.337 While the reforms
initiated in the 1990s under Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt
created substantially more interaction with local groups than the
statue statutes provide,338 these reforms have not fundamentally
altered presidential authority under the Act, nor have they re-
balanced the relationship between federal, state, and local actors as
monuments are being considered. As a result, those whose lives and
communities have been most affected by some very recent national
monument designations have continued to raise objections, in terms
that echo the complaints of those who live near monuments pro-
tected by the statue statutes.339
Much recent scholarship has acknowledged some or all of these
concerns, while ultimately defending the Antiquities Act’s expansive
application because of the need for executive action over the
resources that make up most national monuments, and on the presi-
dent’s legitimacy as the chief executive in a representative democ-
racy.340 This argument is given some added force by the popularity
of national monuments with the general public, as well as the fact
that many national monuments tend to become acceptable, even
336. See, e.g., Exclusive: Utah Delegation’s Joint Response to Obama’s Bears Ears
Monument Designation, DESERET NEWS (Jan. 24, 2017, 12:15 AM), https://www.deseret.com/
2017/1/24/20604616/exclusive-utah-delegation-s-joint-response-to-obama-s-bears-ears-
monument-designation [https://perma.cc/S9FR-PRN9] (arguing that President Obama ignored
local residents and state and local officials in proclaiming this monument); see also Rasband,
supra note 74, at 1 (arguing that the Antiquities Act has repeatedly “been wielded by presi-
dents without any regard for the local rural communities and the state and county govern-
ments most impacted”).
337. See Rasband, supra note 74, at 5-6.
338. Squillace, supra note 45, at 539-40 (describing Babbitt’s reforms in detail).
339. See, e.g., Liston, supra note 58, at 585-86 (describing the destructive effects of
monument decisions determined entirely “by people who do not have to live with the direct
results of their decisions”).
340. See, e.g., Albert C. Lin, Clinton’s National Monuments: A Democrat’s Undemocratic
Acts?, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 707, 737-38 (2002).
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beloved, by nearby communities within a few years of their procla-
mation.341 This is a powerful argument, given still more weight by
the following: without the Antiquities Act as it has been applied
over the past century plus, the Grand Canyon might be partially
flooded or pockmarked by mines. Is this worth the sense of alien-
ation and loss that local communities have felt in the face of monu-
ment proclamations, which they have been essentially powerless to
affect, much less stop? For many, including the author of this
Article, the answer has been yes.
But like all such tests, this essential balancing—between the
costs and the benefits of the Antiquities Act as it has been applied
since shortly after its passage—should be subject to rebalancing as
conditions change. And the increasing virulence that surrounds all
sorts of monument conflicts in this country, along with the rise of
the statue statutes, provide good reasons to consider such a re-
balancing. If we continue to focus on national monuments only as
part of public lands or natural resources law, then the debate over
the Antiquities Act is likely to proceed along familiar lines, what-
ever the result of the current litigation over President Trump’s
attempted monument reduction. But if we shift our focus and
consider national monuments along with built monuments protected
by statue statutes and the NHPA—breaking through the artificial
dichotomy that separates cultural and natural artifacts342—then we
may be able to reframe our fractured monumental debates.
Without statutory reform, the fundamentally anticommunitar-
ian nature of the Antiquities Act will likely persist. Providing an
opportunity for presidents to protect threatened monuments
without waiting for Congress or local communities is, in fact, the
central purpose of the Act. The Act’s core contains an irreducible
disregard for both legislative deliberation and local consultation.
But there may be ways to reform the Antiquities Act to ameliorate
its anticommunitarian nature, and to allow local communities and
their representatives more opportunities to influence the process,
without subjecting monument management to the uncertainty that
341. See, e.g., id. But see Rasband, supra note 74, at 2-3 (arguing that the popularity and
praiseworthy preservation effects of national monuments do not fully redeem democratic
deficiencies in their creation).
342. Klein, supra note 65, at 1365-67, 1369-71.
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President Trump’s proposed reductions pose, and without crippling
the Act’s ability to protect new monuments in the future.
In the past, many legislators have introduced a flood of failed
legislation to ostensibly “reform” the Antiquities Act. Most of these
bills essentially seek to undo the President’s ability to proclaim
monuments in certain areas of the country without some sort of con-
gressional action, or without state and local participation, or some
combination thereof.343 With few exceptions, these efforts have
failed—the Act has displayed substantial resilience, despite its
intense unpopularity in certain parts of the country, because it has
successfully protected what most Americans have come to recognize
as national treasures.344
As part of these efforts to hamstring the Antiquities Act, legisla-
tors sometimes propose extremely short time limits for national
monuments. For example, one recent bill would terminate national
monuments one year after they are designated by presidential
proclamation.345 Of course, a one-year time limit eviscerates rather
than reforms the Antiquities Act346—it does not provide any mean-
ingful security for vulnerable objects covered by the monument
designation, nor does it provide a realistic window for congressional
action. But substantially longer time limits on future monuments
designated by presidential proclamation might have a different
effect.
Consider, for example, a reform of the Antiquities Act that
imposed an initial limit of thirty-two years on new national
monuments designated by presidential proclamation (the “initial
term”).347 At any point within the last twelve years of any new
monument’s initial term, but not before that time, a subsequent
President could renew the designation by proclamation for another
twenty years (the “renewal term”). Any proclamation that expanded
343. See, e.g., id. at 1389-91 (discussing examples).
344. Id. at 1391.
345. National Monument CAP Act, H.R. 3990, 115th Cong. § 2 (2018).
346. See, e.g., Elizabeth Miller, The “No More Parks Act” Could End National Monuments
as We Know Them, BACKPACKER (Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.backpacker.com/news-and-
events/national-monuments-house-bill-rob-bishop [https://perma.cc/W7KV-KMVS] (referring
to the National Monument CAP Act as the “No More Parks Act”).
347. I refer to “new monuments” to make clear that preexisting monuments should be
unaffected by the proposed reform.
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a monument’s boundaries, or that designated a new monument
adjacent to a previously proclaimed monument, would be treated as
if it had been made with the original proclamation. In other words,
such an expansion or adjacent monument would not operate under
a different clock for either the initial or the renewal term. Every
initial term and renewal term proclamation would have to be pre-
ceded by at least 180 days’ notice to the governor and congressional
representatives of any state directly affected by the monument, as
well as a visit to such states by either the President or the Secretary
of the Interior—essentially incorporating Secretary Babbitt’s “no
surprises” policies into the statute as a baseline for state and local
consultation.348 And finally, the reformed Antiquities Act would ex-
pressly provide that no future President could reduce or abolish
either an initial or renewal term designation.
Such a reform would not please everyone—indeed, it likely would
upset many current critics and supporters of the Antiquities Act
alike. But it would preserve the core of the Act, allowing monuments
to be created by executive action for substantial lengths of time
without congressional involvement. And it would remove the un-
certainty that now exists and that may remain after resolution of
the currently pending litigation about whether future presidents
have the unilateral authority to reduce or abolish a predecessor’s
monuments. In place of this uncertainty, the Park Service and other
management agencies would have a relatively predictable timeline,
at least for the first two decades, to develop management plans for
any new monument. Moreover, the time periods of the initial term
and the renewal term would provide significant protection to such
a new monument, plenty of opportunity for Congress to protect the
monument with specific legislation, and abundant incentive for com-
promise that would take into account state and local concerns.
At the same time, the 180-day notice and consultation provision
would force at least a minimal level of federal executive consultation
with state officials and an opportunity for locally affected groups to
influence the decision. In addition, this provision would address
348. See supra note 338 and accompanying text; see also Rasband, supra note 74, at 2-10
(arguing that the Antiquities Act should be reformed to require notice to state and local
governments, and discussing the consultation requirements and time limits on FLPMA’s
withdrawal provisions at 43 U.S.C. § 1714).
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concerns about midnight monument proclamations because it would
require a monument-designating President’s party to face at least
one election after she declared her intentions but before the end of
her term. In other words, even if a future president were to proclaim
a monument in the last ninety minutes of her term, she would have
had to declare her intentions by the preceding July at the latest.
Moreover, the time periods of the initial term and the renewal term
would provide many opportunities for monument opponents to ex-
press their views to their representatives, and multiple validating
(or invalidating) elections in which those representatives and the
underlying views could be tested. For example, if President
Clinton’s 1996 monuments had been created pursuant to the re-
visions outlined here, they would be well within the period in which
they would need either validating legislation or a renewal term
before expiring in 2028.
This raises a final and critically important point. By putting an
expiration date, even a distant one, on any new monument pro-
claimed by the President alone, the reformed statute would under-
mine the arguments raised by many monument opponents about the
democratic legitimacy of the Antiquities Act as it has been applied.
To survive beyond the initial term, a national monument under the
revised Act would have to be renewed by a subsequently elected
President, and in order to survive indefinitely, a national monument
would have to be protected by a subsequently elected Congress—
although the initial term would protect the monument for decades
even without renewal. These changes would not stop debates about
future national monuments. But they would undermine some of the
force of complaints about the Antiquities Act, potentially encourage
compromise and productive legislation about future monuments,
and, perhaps, improve our national conversation about how and why
we should protect our most irreplaceable heirlooms.
The Antiquities Act and the statue statutes are fundamentally
different. The former protects national treasures that cannot be
repaired or replaced, while the latter protect national embarrass-
ments that should be altered or removed. In addition, the statue
statutes reinforce and reiterate the racially discriminatory and
exclusionary messages associated with the monuments they protect.
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But this truth about the statue statutes is not easy for everyone to
accept.
Another truth may be more acceptable to those who defend the
statue statutes and do not or cannot see their discriminatory
character. Like the Antiquities Act, the statue statutes are deeply
anticommunitarian, putting them at odds with other monument-
protection and more broadly historic-preservation laws. And like
some proclamations taken under the Antiquities Act, the statue
statutes often appear to have been created in great haste, without
sufficient forethought for the indefinite protections they purport to
provide.
But here is a crucial difference: the Antiquities Act can be re-
formed, to remove even the appearance of hasty decision-making
that sometimes attaches to national monuments, to decrease its
anticommunitarian tendencies, and to provide more opportunities
for specific national monuments to be validated by subsequent
elections for President and Congress. The statue statutes are be-
yond repair, but the Antiquities Act should be reformed along the
lines suggested here—these reforms are good in themselves, but
they would also isolate the statue statutes, while improving the
quality of our public discourse about monuments and how we should
protect them.
CONCLUSION
A little more than a century ago, the writer, critic, and newspaper
editor Louis Howland wrote about a rural-urban divide in his
country, and the role that a growing appreciation for the nation’s
built and natural monuments seemed to be playing in addressing
this divide.349 Howland loved the history and the natural beauty of
his country, but he was a critical consumer of the influence that
tradition and the monumental weight of history could play. Even as
he celebrated America’s monumental heritage, he also worried that
his country might “develop a spirit of caste, a narrow outlook, a
distaste for travel, and a slavish adherence to old traditions and
customs,” devolving into a settled, fixed, and sadly uniform
349. Louis Howland, Provincial or National?, 43 SCRIBNER’S MAG. 450, 453 (1908). Excerpts
from Howland’s work are discussed in KAMMEN, supra note 11, at 270, 274-75.
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society.350 But citing as an example Walt Whitman’s evocative
appreciation for the Colorado mountains now protected as a
national landmark, as well as the growing affection throughout the
nation’s cities for the “great historic background” that “is more and
more coloring our life,” Howland saw more reasons for hope than
fear in this awakening.351 “[W]e are gradually opening our eyes to
the splendor of our heritage,” Howland wrote—a heritage rich with
lessons of poise, quietness, and wisdom—“and we are all growing old
together.”352
Nearly as much time separates our own moment from Howland’s
as separated Howland’s moment from the nation’s founding. Today,
some of the monument-protection laws discussed in this Article are
almost as old as Howland’s country. We have already grown old—
older, anyway—but we have not grown more together, at least not
as Howland hoped. Instead, the monumental guideposts that he and
others hoped would teach us tolerance and patience have been
transformed into lightning rods for bitter and recurring conflict and
anchors for an ever-widening rural-urban divide.
But these trends are not irreversible—no more so than the
hopeful trends that Howland identified and celebrated. To change
our present course, we should consider monument conflicts and the
laws that protect them together, breaking through the false
dichotomy between cultural and natural significance.353 When we do
this, we will see that some of our monument-protection laws need
to go away, along with the monuments they protect. Some should
stay, but they should be rewritten; others may not need statutory
revision, but we should be more careful in how we apply them.
Above all, we should remember the essential futility of expecting
our monuments to last forever unchanged,354 and the greater futility
of expecting the same from the laws that protect them.
350. Howland, supra note 349, at 453.
351. Id. at 453-54.
352. Id. at 453.
353. Klein, supra note 65, at 1365-71.
354. See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra note 17, at 6-8 (noting that “[a]ll monuments are efforts, in
their own way, to stop time,” but “[h]istory, of course, moves relentlessly to mock” these
efforts).
